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THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BACKGROUND
OF JOHN MARSHALL'S
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
William E. Nelson *t

Between John Marshall's appointment to the Supreme Court in
1801 and Andrew Jackson's inauguration as President in 1829, the
Marshall Court declared one congressional act unconstitutional 1 and
invalidated state statutes in fourteen cases.2 Among these cases were
many of Marshall's major judicial opinions, including Marbury v.
Madison,3 Fletcher v. Peck, 4 McCulloch v. Maryland, 5 Trustees of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 6 and Gibbons v. Ogden.1
Marshall's constitutional cases have been of enduring significance and have generated widespread scholarly debate. Perhaps the
single issue that has most divided scholars is whether the great Chief
Justice should be understood to have been motivated primarily by
political considerations or by more neutral principles that were less
political in character. On the one hand, many scholars have con• Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School. A.B. 1962, Hamilton College; LL.B. 1965,
New York University; Ph.D. 1971, Harvard University.-Ed.
An earlier draft of this essay was delivered as the Thomas M. Cooley Lecture at The
University of Michigan Law School on November 5, 1975. I am grateful to Dean Theodore J.
St. Antoine and his colleagues for the opportunity to deliver that lecture. I am indebted to
Bruce A. Ackerman, Robert A. Burt, Robert M. Cover, Owen M. Fiss, and Jerry L. Mashaw
for their comments and criticisms, and to T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Adam J. Hirsch for
their research assistance. This essay had its origin in conversation with George L. Haskins, to
whom I am especially grateful, at a time when we were both working through the same material.
I. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
2. See Weston v. City Council, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449 (1829); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 419 (1827); Osborn v. President of the Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824); Gibbons
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824); Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) I (1823); Farmers
& Merchanics' Bank v. Smith, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 131 (1821); Trustees of Dartmouth College
v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819); McMillan v. McNeill, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 209 (1819); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 122 (1819); Terret v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815) (dictum); New Jersey v.
Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812); Fletcher v. Peck, IO U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810); United
States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809).
3. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
4. IO U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
5. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
6. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
7. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824).
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eluded, to quote one leading constitutional historian, that "[a]s a
good Federalist, Chief Justice Marshall sought, naturally, to embody
the point of view of his party ... in constitutional law." 8 At the
other extreme, there exists a body of scholarship that understands
Marshall and his contemporaries to have "plant[ed] themselves upon
the provisions of the written Constitution, and den[ied] to popular
legislation the binding force of law, whenever such legislation infringe[d] a constitutional provision." 9
Most recent students of the Marshall Court have found this second view implausible. Well aware of the ambiguities inherent in
written texts, these students have concluded that Marshall could not
possibly have been guided by unambiguous, unchanging legal rules
that pre-existed his decisions. Those who in recent years have emphasized nonpolitical elements in Marshall's constitutionalism have
concentrated on the now neutral principles to which his decisions
gave rise and have given scant attention to the sources from which
those decisions were molded. 10 In particular, they have not questioned the thesis that Marshall embroidered his Federalist political
beliefs into constitutional doctrine. In this essay, I will question that
thesis and will present an alternative suggesting that, even though
there were no specific, pre-existing legal principles from which Marshall could have deduced his major constitutional decisions, his jurisprudence nonetheless had important roots of a nonpolitical sort.
We need a new thesis about the roots of Marshall's constitutionalism for two reasons. One is that students inclined to view Marshall
as a neutral rather than a partisan judge should find it easier to do so
if they can understand him to have been motivated by something
other than the views of a single political group. More significantly, a
new thesis is needed because the existing one, as I am about to show,
does not fully explain the outcome of several of Marshall's cases.
Marshall, according to the received learning, consciously furthered the political goals of the Federalist Party, first, by stretching
the Constitution's meaning to increase national power at the expense
of state power, and, second, by designing constitutional doctrines
8. E. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION 98 (1938).
9. C. TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 163 (1890),
See also R. BERGER, CONGRESS v. THE SUPREME COURT 335-36 (1969); T. COOLEY, A TREA•
TISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 237-38 (7th ed. 1903); I W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS
AND THE CONSTITUTION 50-)92 (1953).
10. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 1-14, 23-28 (1963); H. HART & H.
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 92-93 (1953); T. POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12-23 (1956). For similar views
of an earlier scholar, see J. THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 58-59, 77-78, 84 (1901).
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that protected the upper classes' privileges against the growing democratic onslaught that in 1829 finally placed Andrew Jackson in the
White House. Many scholars have emphasized Marshall's nationalism. Nearly sixty years ago, for instance, Charles Warren wrote of
"Marshall's broad constitutional views" on the scope of national
power. 11 Fifteen years later Felix Frankfurter contended that "Valley Forge made" Marshall 'fa nationalist" and that "ties of friendship and shared labors in the struggle for the Constitution confirmed
his faith." 12 Frankfurter continued that "the deepest article" of Marshall's "faith" as a judge was "[t]he need of a strong central government," not because the Constitution requires it but because, as
Frankfurter suggested, Marshall believed such 'a government would
become "the indispensable bulwark of the solid elements of the nation."13 Similarly, Marshall's biographer, Albert Beveridge, found
that "Marshall unhesitatingly struck down State laws and shackled
State authority" and 'just as firmly and promptly upheld National
laws and National authority." 14 Marshall upheld fe<;leral law, said
Beveridge, "even when he believed the law before him to be unwise
in itself, injurious to the Nation, and, indeed, of extremely doubtful
constitutionality," for "[t]he purpose of his life was to strengthen and
enlarge the powers of the National Govemment." 15 In becoming
"the constructing architect of American Nationalism," 16 Marshall
"rewrote the fundamental law of the Nation." 17
Upon more careful examination, however, it appears that Marshall's nationalism was more limited in scope than the received
learning suggests. Perhaps the Marshall Court was aggressively nationalistic in McCulloch v. Maryland, 18 but it was not nationalistic at
all in United States v. Hudson & Goodwin 19 nor in Wilson v. Black
Bird Creek Marsh Co. 20 In Hudson & Goodwin, Marshall joined in
an opinion rejecting the old and important Federalist plank21 that
11. 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT lN UNITED STATES HISTORY 503-04 (1922).
12. F. FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE
14 (1937).

13. Id.
14. 4 A. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 117 (1919).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 169.
17. Id. at 308. See also R. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS 55 (1971);

C. HAINES, THE
ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT lN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 1789-1835, at 619

(1944).
18.
19.
20.
21.

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).

See

J. SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS 131-33 (1956).
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federal courts had jurisdiction to try common-law crimes. 22 In Black
Bird Creek, Marshall refused to hold that national power to regulate
interstate commerce superseded state regulation where Congress had
not legislated pursuant to that power.23 Although the Marshall
Court may have exhibited more nationalism in McCulloch than
many Americans would have desired, it displayed less in Hudson &
Goodwin and Black Bird Creek.
Marshall in other cases did manifest two limited allegiances to
nationalism, but neither of them was especially political. In United
States v. Peters24 and Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,25 the Marshall
Court posited that state authority could not prevent the execution of
a federal court judgment, and in McCulloch v. Maryland26 and Gibbons v. Ogden 21 it insisted that any state law inconsistent with the
Constitution or an act of Congress was void. But, although these
views were not uncontroversial in Marshall's time, they also were not
"broad constitutional views" 28 of an "ardent nationalist."29 The
Supremacy Clause30 and the Judiciary Act of 178931 mandated the
supremacy of federal law over conflicting state law and the enforceability of federal court judgments as clearly as any legal text requires
a specific result. Marshall or any other Chief Justice could hardly
have proclaimed opposite views, and important representatives of
both political parties, including sitting Presidents such as James
Madison,32 concurred. These nationalistic opinions were less expressions of the Federalist program than essential provisions for an effective federal government.
Moreover, these two narrow aspects of Marshall's nationalism
fail to account for much of his constitutional jurisprudence. They do
not explain, for example, why Marshall read the contract
clause as he did in Fletcher and in .Dartmouth College, or why he so
broadly construed the legislative power of Congress in McCulloch
and Gibbons. A brand of nationalism capable of determining the
results of these four cases would have had to comprehend much
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 34.
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 251-52.
9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809).
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
1 C. WARREN, supra note 11, at 503-04.
R. ELLIS, supra note 17, at 55.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
Ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
See text at note 181 infra.
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more than the supremacy of federal law and the enforceability of
federal court judgments. A narrow reading of Marshall's nationalism, in short, fails to account for the breadth of some of his decisions, while a broad reading does not explain the limitations
imposed by cases like Hudson & Goodwin and Black Bird Creek.
Marshall is also said to have advanced Federalist objectives
through concern "for the protection of the interests of the propertied."33 Upon his death, the New York Evening Post accused Marshall of adhering to "political doctrines . . . of the ultra federal or
aristocratic kind," saying that he "distrusted the virtue and intelligence of the people" and had "been, all his life long, a stumbling
block . . . in the way of democratic principles."34 Historians have
agreed that Marshall distrusted democracy and advanced the interests of aristocrats. Beveridge concluded that Marshall's disposition
of Fletcher v. Peck35 "increased the confidence in him of the conservative elements" and "gave steadiness to commercial intercourse
at a time when it was sadly needed." 36 Charles Haines found Marshall's decisions, particularly .Dartmouth College, designed to secure
''the victory of those who sought to entrench special privileges."37
Morton Horwitz articulated essentially the same position in a recent
lecture which interpreted Marshall's constitutional jurisprudence as
a bulwark against democratic, legislative redistributions of wealth.38
Like interpreting Marshall as a politically motivated nationalist,
interpreting him as an agent of "conservative elements"39 fails to
reconcile the Marshall Court's decisions, or even all the language in
Marshall's own opinions. A line of cases from Sturges v.
Crowninshield40 in 1819 to Ogden v. Saunders41 in 1827 undermines
this interpretation. Those cases tested the power of state legislatures
to pass insolvency laws which hindered creditors in the collection of
debts. Were Marshall seeking to entrench special privilege or to prevent legislative redistributions of wealth, one would expect him to
condemn as broadly as possible all such state laws. Indeed, some
scholars have concluded that Marshall sought to do precisely that in
33. B. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 43 (1942).
34. Quoted in 4 A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 14, at 591.
35. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
36. 3 A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 14, at 594.
37. C. HAINES, supra note 17, at 419.
38. Thomas M. Cooley Lecture delivered by Morton J. Horwitz at The University of Michigan Law School (Nov. 4, 1975).
39. 3 A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 14, at 594.
40. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
41. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
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Sturges and Ogden. 42 But those cases are more ambiguous. In an
opinion by Marshall, the Court rejected an argument in Sturges that
would have won a full and immediate victory for creditors: that
Congress's power to enact bankruptcy legislation preempted and
thereby voided all state bankruptcy or insolvency laws. Instead,
Marshall more narrowly ruled that the contract clause only invalidated state legislation which impaired the obligation of contracts
made before the legislation was enacted.43
Later cases ruled that a statute of one state does not affect the
obligation of a contract made in another state either before or after
the statute,44 but until Ogden v. Saunders,45 the Court never squarely
considered whether a state statute could impair the obligation of a
contract made in the same state after the statute's enactment. A New
York statute, which had been passed before the contract in question
had been made in New York, discharged insolvent debtors who
complied with its provisions. Writing in dissent, Marshall concluded
that the statute was unconstitutional because it sought, by destroying
the underlying obligation of the contract, to prevent all courts, including the Louisiana court in which suit had been commenced,
from enforcing that contract. But he still refused to proclaim as
broad a pro-creditor rule as he might have. Although the New York
legislature could not destroy substantive contract rights and thereby
prevent their enforcement in a federal court or in a court of another
state, it could, Marshall observed, deprive creditors of all remedies in
New York courts for the enforcement of those rights. Thus, in
Ogden as in earlier cases, Marshall did not seize the most extreme
pro-creditor position available but proceeded in a narrow, guarded
way that cannot be explained by a unidimensional thesis that he
served "the interests of the propertied."46
Indeed, the most salient fact about Marshall's constitutional jurisprudence is that his decisions were produced by diverse forces tugging in often conflicting directions. As we have seen, Marshall was
not a consistent nationalist. He took a pro-nationalist stance in
McCulloch but then assumed an anti-nationalist stance in Hudson &
Goodwin and in Black Bird Creek. Similarly, his defense of privi42. See C. HAINES, supra note 17, at 626; B. WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION 28-29 (1938); Morton J. Horwitz, supra note 38.
43. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 196-97.
44. See McMillan v. McNeill, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 209, 213 (1819); ef. Farmers & Mechanics' Bank v. Smith, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 131 (1821) (a state statute may not impair contract
obligations previously made in the same state).
45. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
46. B. WRIGHT, supra note 33, at 431.
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lege in cases like Sturges and Ogden was moderate, not extreme.
This inconsistency and moderation cannot be explained by analyzing only those putative forces-Marshall's Federalist principles-that point in a single direction.
Felix Frankfurter attempted to resolve this problem of explanation in The Commerce Clause Under Marshall, Taney and Waite.
Frankfurter, whose book has for four decades profoundly influenced
scholarship, did not deny that Marshall sought to embody Federalist
principles in constitutional law. Instead, Frankfurter perceived a
more complex, sophisticated process in which Marshall balanced
those principles against other considerations. Thus he wrote that
while Marshall
had rooted principles, he was pragmatic in their application. No less
characteristic than the realization of the opportunities presented by the
commerce clause to restrain local legislatures from hampering the free
play of commerce among the states, was his empiricism in not tying the
Court to rigid formulas for accomplishing such restrictions. His mind
carried a hardheaded appreciation of the complexities of government,
particularly in a federal system. Experience of men and affairs in the
Virginia House of Burgesses, in Congress, as a diplomat, and as Secretary of State had reinforced a temperament to which abstract theorizing was never congenial, howsoever abstract the language in which
he couched concrete results.47

Taking their cue from Frankfurter, other scholars have similarly explained how Marshall's Federalist principles were tempered by factors such as his "rhetorical skill."4 8
For one who, like Frankfurter, believes that law embodies
judges' political views, such a portrait of Marshall illustrates how
judges should temper their inevitable political tendencies. I suspect
that this portrait has helped stimulate scholars such as Alexander
Bickel, Henry Hart, and Herbert Wechsler to develop their subtle
prescriptions for judicial restraint. But, however usefully such a
view of Marshall stimulates theorizing about how judges ought to
behave, it cannot explain with any precision how Marshall in fact
behaved. Historians, for example, cannot accurately describe Marshall as an adherent of Bickel's "passive virtues," since many of
those virtues were not yet developed in Marshall's time. Although
Marshall's motivations may have been similar to those prescribed by
modem legal process theorists, they were not identical, and thus interpretations of his jurisprudence that rely on those modem theories
may be seriously imprecise. Vague and general words like "rhetori•

47. F. F!½NKFURTER, supra note 12, at 14-15.
48. R. FAULKNER, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JOHN

MARSHALL

212 (1968).
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cal skill"49 and "empiricism"50 in lieu of specific descriptions of
countervailing considerations to Marshall's Federalist principles are
similarly flawed.
Interpreting Marshall's constitutional jurisprudence as "embodying his political and economic views" or those of the Federalist
Party51 is not just imprecise. All such explanations are problematic
for at least three other reasons. First, they do not explain how Marshall dominated his Republican colleagues, who after 1811 constituted a majority of the Court. Saying that Marshall somehow
"Federalized" those Republicans through his "steady and directing
influence" 52 hypothesizes much but, as Marshall himself noted, 53 explains little. Second, political interpretations of Marshall's jurisprudence have tended to view Federalism as a monolithic economic and
political ideology, but recent scholarship suggests that the party was
riven by ideological differences.54 Third, the political explanation
ignores early nineteenth-century constitutional doctrines quite similar to Marshall's elaborated by lower federal and state court judges,
not all of whom were Federalists and few of whom were as pragmatic and skillful as Marshall.
Hence, further analysis of the background of Marshall's constitutional jurisprudence is not inappropriate. I will offer in this essay an
interpretation claiming that Marshall, who was born in Virginia in
1755, did not seek to promote the policies of a single political
group55 but attempted instead to preserve, albeit in a limited way,
fragile mid-eighteenth-century processes of government by consensus.56 The essay will further suggest that once Marshall's objective
49. Id.
50. F. FRANKFURTER, supra note 12, at 14.
51. C. HAINES, supra note 17, at 83.
52. Id. at 331, 333.
53. See JOHN MARsHALL'S DEFENSE OF McCULLOCH v. MARYLAND 81-82 (G. Gunther
ed. 1969).
54. See M. DAUER, THE ADAMS FEDERALISTS (1953).
55. On Marshall's apolitical character, see his statement to Joseph Story that he did not
vote in national elections during two of his three decades on the bench. Letter from J. Marshall to J. Story (May 1, 1828), in 14 PROCEEDINGS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL
SOCIETY 335, 336 (2d ser. 1900). In the same letter, Marshall commented, "[l]ntemperate [political] language . . • [did] not become my age or office, and ... [was] foreign from my
disposition or habits." Id.
56. I do not mean to contend that the mid-eighteenth-century style of consensus government was the sole root of Marshall's constitutional jurisprudence. Another source of eighteenth-century values was the natural law-natural rights ideology of that era. For a recent
analysis of that ideology, see Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in
American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978). It seems likely that natural law
and natural rights ideas gained their force by virtue of their widespread acceptability; those
ideas may well have been part of a broader eighteenth-century consensus embracing other
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of consensus building became clear, men of nearly all political
stripes at both federal and state levels could and did join in it.
To explain how Marshall used eighteenth-century political methods to resolve nineteenth-century problems, Part I of this essay analyzes the workings of the main institution of eighteenth-century
government: the courts.57 That analysis suggests that mid-eighteenth-century government officials and lawyers encountered daily a
style of governance which resolved disputes and other problems, not
according to the particular policy preferred by those in power, but
according to a widely shared consensus of values with which they
addressed many though not all the issues brought before them. That
eighteenth-century lawyers and officials did look to those consensual
values meant that the government decided many questions independently of any single individual's or interest group's will. Social
change may have been always threatening to dissolve whatever consensus existed, but, as Part I attempts to show, the power of eighteenth-century juries to determine law evidences the endurance of at
least some degree of consensus.
Part II reviews the emergence in the last decades of the eighteenth century of national political divisions which culminated in the
hotly ~ontested presidential election of 1800. This division brought
to the fore an alternative governmental style in which a majority of
the people self-consciously selected from among competing policies
those that they wished government to effectuate.
Thus, John Marshall and his contemporaries faced a fundamental question in the first years of the nineteenth century: should the
majority's will or should shared values which transcended that will
guide American government? Part III of this essay argues that Marshall sought to accord both styles of government a place in the
American polity. Marshall proposed that the courts have final authority to determine legal questions in a legal manner, that is, that
nineteenth-century courts, like eighteenth-century courts, resolve by
appealing to widely shared values those questions susceptible of such
resolution. On the other hand, Marshall deferred political questions-those which shared values could not answer-to the majorvalues as well. The relationship between natural law and natural rights ideas, on one hand,
and whatever sorts of consensus that existed, on the other, is surely sufficiently complex to
merit full analysis in another essay. I have not systematically pursued an analysis of natural
law as a source of Marshall's jurisprudence, since I find the same difficulties in deriving constitutional rules from natural law that I find in deriving them from the constitutional text. See
text at notes 9-10 supra.
57. The evidence in Part I is derived not only from Marshall's home state of Virginia.
Since the essay is concerned with Marshall's contemporaries as well as with Marshall himself,
data from other states, especially the ~ee largest-Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania-are also considered.
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ity's will as expressed through the politically oriented legislative and
executive branches.
This analysis of Marshall's constitutional jurisprudence avoids
the pitfalls of previous theories. It does not see the Federalist political program as the source of Marshall's constitutional doctrines and
thus does not need to explain how Marshall qualified his political
principles or how he convinced non-Federalist judges to accept
them. Instead, this essay argues that legal, not political, principles
underlay Marshall's jurisprudence, but it attempts to understand
those principles in a manner consistent with the unavoidable twentieth-century assumption that law is a body of flexible rules responsive
to social reality rather than a series of immutable, unambiguous doctrines derived from a nonhuman source. The essay briefly concludes
by returning to the previous interpretations of Marshall's constitutional jurisprudence to compare the merits of those interpretations
with this essay's new interpretation.

I.

GOVERNMENT BY CONSENSUS IN MID-EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICA

A.

The Pervasive and Undifferentiated Role of Colonial Courts

Courts were vital to mid-eighteenth-century colonial government, for that government, unlike our own, had no ubiquitous bureaucracy with clear chains of command reaching upward to central
political authorities. Because there was no modem bureaucracy, the
judiciary and the officials responsible to it (e.g., sheriffs), were the
primary link between a colony's central government and its outlying
localities.58 The judiciary alone could coerce individuals by punishing crimes and imposing money judgments. In some colonies, such
as Virginia, the judiciary was virtually the whole of local govemment,59 but even in colonies where other officials were available, the
nonexistence of doctrines of official immunity rendered those officials subject to judicial control.60 As one of Marshall's contemporaries observed, "[o]ther departments of the Government" may have
been "more splendid," but only the "courts of justice [came] home to
every man's habitation . . . ."6 1

w.

58. See P. BONOMI, A FACTIOUS PEOPLE 145,227 (1971);
NELSON, AMERICANIZATION
OF THE COMMON LAW 13-17 (1975); C. SYDNOR, GENTLEMEN FREEHOLDERS 83-84, 86-93
(1952); C. SYDNOR, PoLmCAL LEADERSHIP IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY VIRGINIA 8 (1951).
59. See C. SYDNOR, GENTLEMEN FREEHOLDERS,
NOR, POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, supra note 58, at 8.

supra note 58, at 83-84, 86-93; C. SYD-

60. See W. NELSON, supra note 58, at 17-18.
61. 18 ANNALS OF CONG. 110 (1802) (remarks of Sen. Hillhouse).

/
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The vital role of the courts in colonial government did not, however, mean that government performed only functions which we today would classify as judicial. Colonial government regulated its
subjects' lives in pervasive detail; government in the Age of Mercantilism sought to insure not only the physical and economic, but the
moral and social well-being of its subjects as well.62 The courts, as a
vital part of the government, maintained order, protected life and
property, apportioned and collected taxes, supervised the construction and maintenance of highways, issued licenses, and regulated
licensees' businesses.63 Through administration of the Settlement
Law, which permitted localities to exclude undesired newcomers,
and the Poor Law, which made localities liable for the support and
hence the general well-being of all who were born and raised in a
. locality and all newcomers who were not excluded, the legal system
fostered community self-definition and a sense of community responsibility for inhabitants.64 Indeed, in some colonies, the courts of
general sessions of the peace, which possessed basic criminal, administrative, and some minor forms of civil jurisdiction, also performed
the executive and even the legislative functions of local govemment.65
The work of the courts, in sum, was of an undifferentiated, pervasive character. The undifferentiated character of that work was important for present ·purposes because it obscured distinctions
between legislation, administration, and adjudication drawn by political theorists. Despite Montesquieu's early statement of the mod62. For example, Parliament passed the Navigation Acts to increase the wealth of the entire empire, see generally 0. DICKERSON, THE NAVIGATION ACTS AND THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1951); L. HARPER, THE ENGLISH NAVIGATION LAWS (1939), and colonial legislatures passed inspection acts to promote the sale of colonial products abroad, see J. GOEBEL &
T. NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK 41 n.201 (1944); 0. HANDLIN &
M. HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH 64-65 (rev. ed. 1969). Nine of the thirteen colonies established
state religions and all the colonies prosecuted immorality in such varying forms as fornication,
drunkenness, profanity, and desecration of the Sabbath. See J. GOEBEL & T. NAUGHTON,
supra, at 39-40, 100-06; w. NELSON, supra note 58, at 36-40; A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW IN
COLONIAL VIRGINIA 280-81, 291-92 (1930); R. SEMMES, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN EARLY
MARYLAND 148-49, 161-65 (1938); Flaherty, Law and the Eeforcement of Morals in Early
America, in 5 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 212-24 (1971).
63. See P. BONOMI, supra note 58, at 36 n.27; R. IRELAND, THE COUNTY COURTS IN ANTEBELLUM KENTUCKY 18-31 (1972); W. NELSON, supra note 58, at 15; C. SYDNOR, AMERICAN
REVOLUTIONARIES IN THE MAKING 80-85 (1965).
64. See M. CREECH, THREE CENTURIES OF POOR LAW ADMINISTRATION 8-75 (1936); J.
HENTON, WARNING OUT IN NEW ENGLAND 9, 118-21 (1911).
65. See R. IRELAND, supra note 63, at 18; W. NELSON, supra note 58, at 15; C. SYDNOR,
supra note 63, at 80; Bockelman, Local Government in Colonial Pennsylvania, in TOWN AND
COUNTY 216, 216-21 (B. Daniels ed. 1978); Carr, The Foundations ofSocial Order: Local Government in Colonial Maryland, in TOWN AND COUNTY 72, 91-93 (B. Daniels ed. 1978). Local
courts had fewer powers, however, in New York and South Carolina. See P. BONOMI, supra
note 58, at 35-36; M. SIRMANS, COLONIAL SOUTH CAROLINA 250-252 (1966).
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em doctrine of separation of powers,66 Americans as late as the
1780s generally regarded the courts as part of the executive and did
not routinely distinguish the judiciary as an independent branch
which exercised only ''judicial" functions: they did not, that is, distinguish law from politics. As one tract observed,
Government is generally distinguished into three parts, Executive,
Legislative and Judicial, but this is more a distinction of words than
things. . . . [H]owever we may refine and define, there is no more
than two powers in any government, viz, the power to make laws, and
the power to execute them; for the judicial power is only a branch of
the executive, the CHIEF of every country being the first magistrate.67

The pervasive character of the courts' work was important because it placed the courts, which are today at the periphery of governmental activity, at the core instead. It insured that men like John
Marshall who learned the ways of government in the Revolutionary
era would be familiar with the manner in which courts functioned.
And it requires, if we are to understand the background and training
of Marshall's generation, that we too study the workings of mideighteenth-century courts and of their most important agency, the
jury.

B. The Law-finding Power of Juries
Although judges with the multifarious duties of mid-eighteenthcentury courts were prominent local leaders, they were leaders who
had power only to guide, not to command. For juries rather than
judges spoke the last word on law enforcement in nearly all, if not
all, of the eighteenth-century American colonies. Except in equitable actions, which were nonexistent in some colonies and narrowly
limited in the rest, 68 judges could not enter a judgment or impose a
penalty without a jury verdict. 69 And, in the cases in which they sat,
66. For a discussion of Montesquieu, see M. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARA·
TION OF POWERS 76-97 (1967).
67. Four Letters on Interesting Subjects 21 (Philadelphia 1776). For other similar statements, see M. VILE, supra note 66, at 139. This merely reflected older views. For example,
Thomas Hutchinson, the pre-Revolutionary chiefjustice and governor of Massachusetts, spoke
of courts as part of "the Executive Body" and possessors of "Executive" as distinguished from
"Legislative" power. Charge to the Grand Jury, Quincy 307 (Mass. 1769). John Adams similarly regarded "the first grand division of constitutional powers" as "those of legislation and
those of execution," with "the administration of justice" resting in "the executive part of the
constitution." J. ADAMS, Tlte Earl of Clarendom lo William Pym in 3 THE Worucs OF JOHN
ADAMS 480-82 (C. Adams ed. 1851). Although Adams drafted most of the Massachusetts
Constitution of 1780, he did not draft its famous separation of powers clause. See M. VILE,
supra note 66, at 149.
68. See Katz, Tlte Politics of Law in Colonial America, in 5 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 257, 262-65 (1971).
69. See W. NELSON, supra note 58, at 21.
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eighteenth-century juries, unlike juries today, usually possessed the
power to determine both law and fact.
Although the common law of eighteenth-century England recognized several devices for controlling jury findings of law and fact,
mid-eighteenth-century American courts appear not to have used
them extensively in either civil or criminal cases. One device apparently in use in England was special pleading and the exclusion from
evidence of all matters immaterial to the special plea. Special pleading had the capacity of framing a single, simple factual question for
the jury which the jury could decide without passing upon the law,
since the court's prior determination of the legal sufficiency of proffered pleas resolved all questions of law before a case was given to
the jury.70 But there is no evidence that special pleading was widely
used in colonial America, except perhaps in early eighteenth-century
Maryland.71 Litigants usually preferred to try cases not under a special plea, but under a plea of the general issue, so called because it
imported an absolute and general denial of every allegation and put
all the allegations in issue before the jury. When the general issue
was pleaded, juries did not confront only evidence directly relevant
to a single issue, but instead heard evidence on several issues and
during deliberation had to decide how those issues related to each
other.72 Thus, jurors found not only facts but also the legal conse70. Id at 21-22 and sources cited therein.
71. Litigants in Massachusetts rarely continued special pleading beyond defendant's initial
plea and the plaintiffs joinder of issue or joinder in demurrer, see id at 23, and the published
colonial cases suggest that special pleading was also rare in Pennsylvania and Virginia. The
only special pleading case reported in pre-Revolutionary Pennsylvania, Swift v. Hawkins, 1
Dall. 17 (Pa. 1768), involved merely a joinder of issue to a plea of payment in a writ of debt.
No cases of special pleading are recorded in REPORTS OF CASES DETERMINED IN THE GENERAL COURT OF VIRGINIA FROM 1730 TO 1740; AND FROM 1768 TO 1772 (T. Jefferson ed.
1829), the only volume of pre-Revolutionary Virginia cases. Special pleading may have been
common in Maryland from about 1710 to 1730, since it occurred in seven out of twenty-one
reported cases. See Brooke v. Macnemara, I H. & McH. 80 (Md. Provincial Ct. 1728); Lord
Proprietary v. Gibbs, I H. & McH. 58 (Md. Provincial Ct. 1723); Lord Proprietary v. Wright, I
H. & McH. 49 (Md. Provincial Ct. 1722); Hemsley v. Smith, I H. & McH. 42 (Md. Provincial
Ct. 1720); Lord Proprietary v. Cockshut, I H. & McH. 40 (Md. Provincial Ct. 1720); Gresham
v. Gassaway, I H. & McH. 34 (Md. Provincial Ct. 1718); Tanner v. Freeland, I H. & McH. 34
(Md. Provincial Ct. 1718). But special pleading appears to have been less common thereafter,
occuring in only four of eighty-six non-chancery cases reported between 1730 and 1774. See
Coursey v. Wright, I H. & McH. 394 (Md. Provincial Ct. 1771); Lord Proprietary v. Bond, I H.
& McH. 210 (Md. Provincial Ct. 1760); Hammond v. Denton, I H. & McH. 200 (Md. Provincial Ct. 1755); Lewis v. Cooke, I H. & McH. 159 (Md. Provincial Ct. 1749).
72. A plea of the general issue did ~ot frame a single, precise factual question for two
reasons. First, a typical complaint alleged several facts, all of which a general denial put in
issue. Second, courts did not restrict the parties (as they did in the case of a special plea) to
proof only of facts tending to verify their allegations. The test of admissibility of evidence
under the general issue was not relevance to a single factual question, but whether as a matter
of law the proposed evidence ought to constitute a good defense to the plaintiff's action. W.
NELSON, supra note 58, at 22-23. Thus, the court might permit a defendant to present to the
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quences of facts; that is, absent other restrictions they decided the
law. The result was that, although special pleading had the potential
to reduce the power of juries to determine law as well as fact, its
disuse in colonial America prevented it from attaining that potential.
A second common-law device to control juries' findings of law
was the special verdict, by which a jury merely stated its factual conclusions without expressing any opinion about which party should
win. The court then applied the law to the facts and rendered judgment. This procedure was not especially effective in controlling the
law-finding powers of colonial American juries, however, since all
the litigants had to agree to it. Any party could as a matter of right,
demand a general verdict in which the jury applied the law to the
facts. 73 When it was used, counsel on both sides would usually draft
notes for the verdict which the jury then rendered; but even then the
verdict could be entered on the record only if objections by counsel
for both litigants were resolved to their mutual satisfaction. Litigants probably used special verdicts chiefly in complex factual cases
where both sides were at least as interested in a judicial declaration
of law for their future guidance as in a resolution of the pending
dispute.74 In typical cases, especially if one of the parties anticipated
that the jury would render a favorable general verdict, special verdicts were rare.
Furthermore, it was not clear that an unwilling jury could be
forced to return a special verdict even if both parties desired one.
John Adams, for instance, denied that juries were ''under any legal
or moral or divine Obligation to find a Special Verdict where they
themselves are in no doubt of the Law."75 The Maryland Provincial
Court apparently shared that view, for after the jury in Smith's
Lessee v. Broughton16 returned a general verdict in favor of the dejury not only evidence relating to facts raised by the plaintiff (e.g., evidence of performance in
an action of assumpsit), but evidence of other facts as well. Indeed, by the outbreak of the
American Revolution, the courts of Massachusetts, see id at 23; Maryland, see Drane v.
Hodges, 1 H. & McH. 518 (Md. 1773); and perhaps other colonies were even allowing defendants to put in evidence under the general issue matters which under strict common-law rules
had to be pleaded specially.
73. See general(y Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L,
REv. 289, 307-10 (1966); Wroth & Zobel, Introduction to 1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS at
xlvii (L. Wroth & H. Zobel eds. 1965).
74. This is at least my sense after an extensive, albeit unsystematic, search of Massachusetts court records from the mid-eighteenth century.
75. 1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 230 (L. Wroth & H. Zobel eds. 1965).
76. 1 H. & McH. 33 {Md. Provincial Ct. 1714). As recorded, the disposition of the case is
ambiguous and subject to misinterpretation if read in isolation. Because the final entry in
Broughton is "ti]udgment on the verdict of nonsuit," the case has been read to grant a compulsory nonsuit "by implication." Henderson, supra note 73, at 301 n.25. In fact, this literal reading of the entry is impossible: the verdict in Broughton was for the defendant, the plaintiff was
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fondant even though the court, with both parties' consent, had instructed it to find a special verdict, the Maryland court rejected the
plaintiffs argument that the jury's disobedience warranted an arrest
of judgment.77
Some scholars believe that the demurrer to the evidence and the
compulsory nonsuit, somewhat similar and overlapping procedures,
were also available to prevent juries from applying law to facts. 78
Although either party could claim through a demurrer to the evidence that his opponent's evidence was insufficient to support an allegation, it appears that defendants demurred more commonly than
plaintiffs, often claiming at the close of a plaintiffs affirmative case
that the evidence did not support the cause of action.79 When such
the moving party, and a plaintiff could not nonsuit himself. See note 79 infra. As the entry
immediately followed the recording of the motion in arrest of judgment, and as a nonsuit
normally did not constitute a final judgment but permitted a plaintiff to seek a new trial, the
use of the expression might alternatively be construed as a rejection of the jury's perverse
verdict and permission for the plaintiff to seek a new trial. However, when the ambiguous text
is compared with other cases in the volume of reports edited by Harris and McHenry, it becomes apparent that the courts sporadically used the term "nonsuit" in this context to indicate
a final judgment for the defendant rather than a trial de novo. We find entries roughly
equivalent to Broughton's on two other occasions in the volume: "Verdict for the defendant,
and judgment of nonsuit." Carroll's Lessee v. Llewellin, 1 H. & McH. 162, 168 (Md. Provincial Ct. 1750); Black v. Digge's Exrs., 1 H. & McH. 153, 153 (Md. Provincial Ct. 1744). We
may infer with confidence that '1udgment of nonsuit" in these cases translates into '1udgment
for defendant" and not trial de novo because (1) technical nonsuits were impossible since the
verdicts were for defendant; (2) the verdicts in both cases accorded with the courts' instructions
and hence were not potentially vitiable as verdicts "against law," see text at note 106 i,!fra; and
especially (3) the plaintiffs appealed both judgments. Thus the phrase "ij]udgment on the
verdict of nonsuit" in Broughton probably indicates the entry of judgment for defendant, as
dictated by the verdict, despite the plaintiff's motion in arrest of judgment on the ground that
the jury's general verdict violated the agreement of the parties. An evaluation of the case
found in the index to the volume further confirms this conclusion. See 1 H. & McH. at 596.
77. For a New York case in which a jury returned a general verdict after the parties had
agreed on a special one, see Brown v. Clock (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1695), reprinted in COLLECTIONS OF
THE NEW-YORK HISTORICAL SOCIETY FOR THE YEAR 1912, at 69-70 (1913). English authority
existed for both the proposition that a jury could return a general verdict against the parties'
agreement to accept a special one, and the contrary proposition that a general verdict rendered
in those circumstances should be set aside. Compare Gay v. Cross, 7 Mod. 37, 87 Eng. Rep.
1078 (K.B. 1702); Anonymous, 3 Salk. 373, 91 Eng. Rep. 881 (K.B. 1697); 2 J. LILLY, THE
PRACTICAL REGISTER: OR, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 793 E (2d ed. 1735), with
The King v. Poole, Cas. t. Hard. 23, 95 Eng. Rep. 15 (K.B. 1734); Pocklington v. Hatton, 8
Mod. 220, 88 Eng. Rep. 158 (K.B. 1724); Regina v. Ballivos de Bewdley, 1 P. Wms. 207, 24
Eng. Rep. 357 (Ch. 1712); 2 J. LILLY, supra, at 798 C. The English cases are discussed in
Henderson, supra note 73, at 307-09.
78. See Henderson, supra note 73, at 300-01, 304-05.
79. Although a plaintiff could theoretically demur to a defendant's evidence, see Kissam v.
Burrell, Kirby 326,328 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1787); Smith v. Steinbach, 2 Cai. Cas. 158, 171 (N.Y.
1805); Lessee of the Proprietary v. Ralston, 1 Dall. 18, 18 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1773), he rarely advanced his interest by doing so. Even if the court held the defendant's evidence objectionable,
judgment could not be entered for the plaintiff since a defendant who did not concede the
veracity of the plaintiff's evidence would normally still be entitled to his right to have the jury
pass upon the truth of that evidence. Nor could a defendant, such as the royal customs collector in Erving v. Cradock, Quincy 553 (Mass. 1761), see text at note 105 i,!fra, elect by way of
demurrer to present an affirmative defense to the court rather than the jury, since only the
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demurrers were interposed, the judge, circumventing the jury, would
rule on the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence. According to
an early nineteenth-century case in South Carolina, the nonsuit similarly lay "wherever it appears that the evidence is insufficient to
make out the plaintiff's case, or where there is a total failure of proof
necessary for that purpose." 80 In such a case, a trial court was directed to grant a defense motion for nonsuit "whether the plaintiff
consent or not." 8 I
However, neither the compulsory nonsuit nor the demurrer to evidence effectively reined jury power in eighteenth-century America.
Prior to 1800, published reports include no case in which the compulsory nonsuit was used to prevent a jury from determining an issue
of law otherwise before it.82 The demurrer to evidence, though extant in five states, 83 similarly failed to keep cases away from the jury
plaintiff could demur to the defendant's evidence and thereby take consideration of the evidence away from the jury; a defendant could not demur to his own evidence. And, as a doctrinal matter, of course, only a defendant could obtain a nonsuit in his favor. See Hopkins v. De
Graffenreid, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 441,445 (1802); 5 M. BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW
140-41 (1st American ed. from the 6th London ed. 1811); W. WYCHE, A TREATISE ON THE
PRACTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK IN CIVIL
ACTIONS 167 (2d ed. New York 1794); Henderson, supra note 73, at 300-01.
80. Hopkins v. De Graffenreid, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 441, 445 (1802).
81. Hopkins v. De Graffenreid, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 441, 445 (1802). English authority existed
for nonsuiting a plaintiff even after a jury had rendered a verdict in his favor if a nonsuit
would have been appropriate prior to submission of the case to the jury. See, e.g., Abbot v.
Plumbe, I Doug!. 216, 99 Eng. Rep. 141 (K.B. 1799); Bird v. Randall, 1 Bl.W. 373, 96 Eng,
Rep. 210_ (K.B.), reargued, I Bl.W. 387, 96 Eng. Rep. 218 (K.B. 1762).
82. The only states in which nonsuit cases have been found are Maryland, New Jersey,
New York, Pennsylvania and South Carolina. See Henderson, supra note 73, at 301. In
Maryland, the earliest reported case occurred in 1802. See Webb's Lessee v. Beard, I H. & J.
349 (Gen. Ct. 1802). In New Jersey, the earliest reported case occurred in 1807. See Pearson v.
Hopkins, 2 N.J.L. 181 (Sup. Ct. 1807). In New York, the earliest reported case occurred in
1800. See Pratt v. Hull, 13 Johns. 334 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1816); Percival v. Jones, 2 Johns. Cas. 49
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1800). In South Carolina, the Superior Court claimed the right to order a
nonsuit in a 1798 case and an 1802 case, although it did not exercise that right on either
occasion. See Brown v. Frost, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 125 (1798); Hopkins v. De Gralfenreid, 2
S.C.L. (2 Bay) 441,445 (1802). The court's statement on the latter occasion that nonsuits were
"the invariable practice both before and since (1798]," 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) at 445, should not be
taken at face value, however. q: W. NELSON, supra note 58, at 9-10 (courts purported to
follow English law when in fact they did not). In Pennsylvania, the compulsory nonsuit was
utilized in the 1790s, apparently to decide issues of pleading which could otherwise have been
handled by a demurrer to the pleadings. See Mullen v. Ridgeway, Add. Pa. 278 (Fayette
County Ct. 1795); Farnesly v. Murphy, Add. Pa. 22 (Allegheny County Ct. 1792). In the
1770s, the nonsuit also served as a device by which a plaintiff could elect not to receive a
verdict which he anticipated would be against him. See Anonymous, 1 Dall. 20 (Pa. 1773);
Lessee of Richardson v. Campbell, I Dall. 10 (Pa. 1764). But see Lessee of the Proprietary v.
Ralston, 1 Dall. 18 (Pa. 1773), a poorly reported case in which a motion for a nonsuit, the
nature of which was unclear, was denied. I do not take the Maryland case of Smith's Lessee v.
Broughton, 1 H. & McH. 33 (Md. Provincial Ct. 1714), which has been read as a nonsuit case,
see Henderson, supra note 73, at 301, to have been such. See note 76 supra.
83. Connecticut, Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. Connecticut: Kissam
v. Burrall, Kirby 326, 328 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1787). Maryland: Lord Proprietary v. Bond, 1 H.
& McH. 210,210 (Md. Provincial Ct. 1760); Savory's Lessee v. Whayland, 1 H. & McH. 206,
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because procedural disadvantages discouraged its use. 84
Thus, due to the apparent infrequency of special pleading and
the ineffectiveness of demurrers to the evidence and procedures for
compulsory nonsuits and special verdicts, juries usually must have
returned general verdicts in lawsuits not decided by default. In the
absence of modem procedural devices such as judicial instructions
on law and evidence and the practice of setting aside verdicts contrary to law or evidence, this meant that juries in both civil and criminal cases were usually called upon to find both law and fact.
Although these modem devices were in use in England by the time
of Bright v. Eynon 85 and Appleton v. Sweetapple, 86 neither device
206 (Md. Provincial Ct. 1755); Beale et Ux. Lessee v. Digges, 1 H. & McH. 26, 27 (Md. Provincial Ct. 1705); Seward's Lessee v. Hicks, 1 H. & McH. 22, 22 (Md. Provincial Ct. 1705). New
York: Smith v. Steinbach, 2 Cai. Cas. 158, 158 (N.Y. 1805); Thurman v. Tucker (N.Y. Mayor's
Ct. 1744), reprinted in AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION, SELECT CASES OF THE MAYOR'S
COURT OF NEW YORK CITY 1674-1784, at 155, 159 (R. Morris ed. 1935) [hereinafter cited as
MAYOR'S COURT OF NEW YORK CITY]; Fullerton v. Sincklair (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1703), reprinted
in 2 P. HAMLIN & C. BAKER, SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW
YORK 1691-1704, at 141, 142, 162 (1959) [hereinafter cited as P. HAMLIN & C. BAKER]; Nightingall v. Lott, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1703), reprinted in P. HAMLIN & C. BAKER, supra at 150, 151;
Ewetse v. Rosavelt, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1703), reprinted in P. HAMLIN & C. BAKER, supra at 153,
162, 218. Pennsylvania: Hurst v. Dippo, 1 Dall. 20, 21 (Pa. 1774); Lessee of the Proprietary v.
Ralston, 1 Dall. 18, 18 (Pa. 1773). Virginia: Stephens v. White, 2 Va. (2 Wash.) 203, 203
(1796).
84. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court implied in Hurst v. Dippo, I Dall. 20 (Pa. 1774),
the demurrer to the evidence was "disused" in most colonies. The most severe disadvantage
was that the demurrant had to admit all the facts shown in the evidence against him and all
adverse inferences that could be drawn from those facts. See Thurman v. Tucker (N.Y.
Mayor's Ct. 1744), reprinted in MAYOR'S COURT OF NEW YORK CITY, supra note 83, at 155,
159. In addition, the demurrant lost his case when a demurrer to the evidence was overruled,
but when a demurrer was sustained in a case that involved additional issues, the jury would
still determine the merits of the case under instructions to ignore the objectionable evidence it
had heard. For examples of two cases that were determined by a jury after at least one of the
parties attempted to demur to the evidence, see Brown v. Clock (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1695), reprinted
in COLLECTIONS OF THE NEW-YORK HISTORICAL SOCIETY FOR THE YEAR 1912, at 69-70
(1913); Lessee of the Proprietary v. Ralston, l Dall. 18 (Pa. 1773). Similarly, 3 G. GILBERT,
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 1214-15 (C. Lofil ed. 1797), suggests that a demurrer would not always
take a case away from the jury.
Dippo itself illustrates yet another difficulty with the demurrer. The plaintiff claimed title
to the land in dispute through an ancestor whose name was among the grantees on a list that
bore the warrant, seal, and signature of William Penn. The defendant's demurrer essentially
raised an issue oflaw-whether the list constituted a deed from Penn to the ancestor-yet the
court refused to permit the demurrer and directed the jury "to draw their inference" about title
to the land "from the evidence laid before them" and ''the custom of the province, in the like
cases." l Dall. at 21. (Apparently for decorum's sake, the court prefaced this ruling with the
contradictory statement that "[i]t is a settled rule, that courts of law determine law; a jury
facts." I Dall. at 21.) Although the Pennsylvania courts surely would have sustained a demurrer to the evidence if a plaintiff introduced evidence of an assumpsit to prove a trespass vi et
armis, those courts at least seem to have been unprepared in less blatant cases to use that
procedure to negate the jury's effective power to determine law and custom.
85. I Burr. 390, 2 Keny. 53, 96 Eng. Rep. 1104 (K.B. 1757). For the English practice on
rejection of jury verdicts, see generally Henderson, supra note 73, at 311-12; Note on the Development of the Right to a New Trial in England (forthcoming in 3 HAMILTON LEGAL PAPERS (J. Goebel & J. Smith eds. 1979)).
86. 3 Doug!. 137, 140-41, 99 Eng. Rep. 579, 580 (K.B. 1782).
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was an effective instrument for jury control in pre-Revolutionary
America.
Instructions to the jury were ineffective for several reasons. First,
it appears that in many cases instructions were brief and rudimentary. In Massachusetts, lawyers could and did assume that jurors
were "good judges of the common law of the land," 87 since "[t]he
general Rules of Law and common Regulations of Society, under
which ordinary Transactions arrange[d] themselves, . . . [were]
well enough known to ordinary Jurors." 88 Accordingly juries might
be directed that, as to many matters, they "need[ed] no Explanation
[since] your Good Sence & understanding will Direct ye as to
them." 89 In Connecticut, the court merely summarized the opposing
claims without commenting on the law involved in the case, 90 while
in New Hampshire one judge told a jury "to do justice between the
parties not by any quirks of the law . . . but by common sense as
between man and man." 91 Likewise, in one criminal case in colonial
New York, Chief Justice Mompesson informed the jury that "there
are some points [oflaw] I am not now prepared to answer," 92 while
in another case the court informed the jury only that the evidence
from the prosecution's witnesses seemed "so ample, so full, so clear
and satisfactory" that it should convict the prisoner "if you have no
particular reasons in your own breast, in your own consciences to
discredit them." 93 Similarly, in South Carolina civil litigation in the
1780s, one jury was instructed "to find a general verdict, or a special
one, ... as they thought proper," 94 while another jury was told "to
give what they thought reasonable" in "damages." 95 In other cases,
no instructions were given at all; in Virginia, for example, according
to one commentator, there were "numerous cases" in which the jury
"retired without a word said by the court upon the subject" of the
case.96
87. Letter from James Sullivan to Elbridge Gerry (Dec. 25, 1779) (unpublished letter, Massachusetts Historical Society), quoted in W. NELSON, supra note 58, at 26.
88. 1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 75, at 230.
89. Grand Jury Charge (1759) (unpublished records, 1 Cushing Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society), quoted in W. NELSON, supra note 58, at 26.
90. See Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582, 601 (1939).
91. See G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 297 (1969).
92. Queen v. Makemie, 4 Force, Tracts no. 4, 44 (1707), quoted in J. GOEBEL & T.
NAUGHTON, supra note 62, at 666.
93. King v. Hughson, Horsmander Papers 120 (1741) (manuscript of New York Historical
Society Library), quoted in J. GOEBEL & T. NAUGHTON, supra note 62, at 667.
94. Pledger v. Wade, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 35, 36 (1786).
95. Eveleigh v. Administrators of Stitt, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 92, 92 (1789). See also Liber v.
Executors of Parsons, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 19 (1785).
96. Commonwealth v. Garth, 3 Leigh 761, 773, 30 Va. 825,838 (General Ct. 1831) (Leigh's
amic\1$ curiae brief). See also W. NELSON, supra note 58, at 26.
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Instructions were also ineffective because they were often contradictory. One potential source of contradiction was counsel, who on
summation could argue the law as well as the facts, at least in Georgia, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and
Virginia,97 and probably in other colonies for which no direct evidence is available. Most confusing of all was the court's seriatim
charge. Nearly every court in eighteenth-century America sat with
more than one judge upon the bench, 98 and it appears to have been
97. For Georgia, see Robinson v. Adkins, 19 Ga. 398, 400, 402 (1856); Thornton v. Lane,
11 Ga. 459, 485 (1852). These cases probably mirrored prior practice, since the nineteenth
century's general trend was to limit counsel's right to argue. For Massachusetts, see W. NELSON, supra note 58, at 26, 28-30. For New York, see J. GOEBEL & T. NAUGHTON, supra note
62, at 660-66; Letter from Cadwallader Colden to the Earl of Halifax (Dec. 13, 1764), reprinted
in 1 DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 681,
682 (E. O'Callaghan ed. 1856). For Pennsylvania, see Boehm v. Engle, 1 Dall. 15 (Pa. 1767);
testimony of Judge Edward Tilghman, reprinted in REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF THE HONORABLE
SAMUEL CHASE 27 (1805). In Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 3 (1794), a Supreme
Court case heard before a Philadelphia jury, opposing counsels' arguments on the law lasted
for four days, after which Chief Justice Jay informed the box that the case had "been treated
by the Counsel with great learning, diligence and ability; and on your part it has been heard
with particular attention . . . . [Y]ou are now, if ever you can be, completely possessed of the
merits of the cause." For South Carolina, see Payne v. Trezevant, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 23 (1796);
Pringle v. Executors of Witten, I S.C.L. (1 Bay) 256, 259 (1792). For Virginia, see Letter from
James Maury to John Camm (Dec. 12, 1763), reprinted in J. FONTAINE, MEMOIRS OF A HUGUENOT FAMILY 421-23 (1872) (discussing Parson's Cause (1763), see note 110 i'!fra).
98. For Connecticut, see 5 THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT, 23840 (C. Hoadly ed. 1870) (records of 1711); 8 id. at 91 (1874) (records of 1737); G. CLARK, A
HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT 85 (1914); Hewitt, The Administration ofJustice in Connecticut, in 3
HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT 137 (N. Osborn ed. 1925). For Georgia, see 7 THE COLONIAL
RECORDS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 43-45, 57 (A. Chandler ed. 1904-1916) (records of 1754),
id. at 504 (records of 1757); 18 id. at 378-79 (1910) (records of 1760); A. SAYE, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF GEORGIA, 1732-1968, at 63 (rev. ed. 1970); Flippin, The Royal Government
in Georgia, 1752-1776: VL The Judicial System and Administration, 10 GA. HIST. Q. 251, 26061 (1926). For Maryland, see 22 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND 494 (B. Steiner ed. 1902-1910)
(records of 1699); 23 id. at 128-30 (records of 1697); 27 id. at 367 (records of 1708); 30 id. at 299
(records of 1715); N. MERENESS, MARYLAND AS A PROPRIETARY PROVINCE 237, 246-47
(1901). For Massachusetts, see W. NELSON, supra note 58, at 15-16, 26. For New York, see 1
THE COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK 227-29 (R. Cummings ed. 1894) (records of 1691); id. at
307 (records of 1692); id. at 387 (records of 1699); 2 id. at 466 (records of 1728); 2 id. at 746
(records of 1732); 2 id. at 964 (records of 1737); 3 id. at 188 (records of 1741); 3 id. at 378
(records of 1744); 3 id. at 472 (records of 1745); 3 id. at 1011 (records of 1754); 4 id. at 296
(records of 1758); 4 id. at 372 (records of 1759); 4 id. at 969 (records of 1768); 4 id. at 1079
(records of 1769); 4 id. at 1088 (records of 1769); 5 id. at 304,360 (records of 1772); J. GOEBEL
& T. NAUGHTON, supra note 62, at 91, 156-68; 2 P. HAMLIN & C. BAKER, supra note 83, at 5877; Note, Law in Colonial New York: The Legal System of1691, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1757, 176467 (1967). For Pennsylvania, see 3 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA 246 (J.
Mitchell & H. Flanders eds. 1896-1902) (records of 1721); id. at 298 (records of 1722); id. at
302-05 (records of 1722); 4 id. at 88-91 (records of 1727); 7 id. at 107-10 (records of 1767); W.
LLOYD, THE EARLY °COURTS OF PENNSYLVANIA 74-122 (1910){reprinted from 56 (old ser.) u.
PA. L. REV. 28 (1908)). After 1767, the Pennsylvania circuit court quorum was reduced to one
justice. 7 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra, at 107-10 (records of 1767).
For Virginia, see 3 THE STATUTES AT LARGE: BEING A COLLECTION OF THE LAWS OF VIR·
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the general rule for every judge who was sitting to deliver a charge if
he wished to do so. Perhaps the most revealing case is Georgia v.
Brai!sford, 99 where the Supreme Court of the United States sat in
1793 with a Philadelphia jury in an original action brought by the
state of Georgia against the defendant Brailsford. There Chief Justice John Jay, reporting perhaps upon his understanding of the general state of American law, told the jury that it was "fortunate on the
present, as it must be on every occasion, to find the opinion of the
court unanimous" and to have the court "entertain no diversity of
sentiment" and "experience . . . no difficulty in uniting in the
charge." 100 Such unanimity was not always the case. In both Massachusetts and South Carolina there are examples from the Revolutionary period of judges giving conflicting instructions to juries, 101
and as late as 1803 Alexander Addison, a Common Pleas judge in
Pennsylvania, was successfully impeached for refusing to permit
other judges on his court to address juries. 102 Only in Maryland does
the routine practice by counsel of preserving exceptions to objectionable instructions suggest that trial judges were required to deliver a
single, correct set of instructions or face the prospect of reversal for
error. 103
GINIA 143 (W. Hening ed. 1810-1823) (records of 1733); 5 id. at 469 (records of 1746); 5 id. at
489-91 (records of 1748); 6 id. at 327 (records of 1769). South Carolina appears to have been
exceptional. Apart from the brief period 1721-1731, the colony had no local courts, and at
most times the court of common pleas that sat in Charlestown was attended by a single chief
justice. See Jenkins v. Putnam, I S.C.L. (I Bay)8, 8 n. (1784);3 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF
SOUTH CAROLINA 282-83 (T. Cooper & D. McCord eds. 1836-1841) (records of 1731); id. at
326 (records of 1731); id. at 555 (records of 1740); id. at 632 (records of 1744); 7 id. at 189-91
(records of 1737); 7 id. at 194 (records of 1767);
SMITH, SOUTH CAROLINA AS A ROYAL
PROVINCE, 1719-1776, at 131, 145-47 (1903); E. WHITNEY, GOVERNMENT OF THE COLONY OF
SOUTH CAROLINA 78 (1895). Aside from the regular courts, justices of the peace could try
small claims cases without a jury in most colonies.
99. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) I (1794).
100. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 4.
IOI. See Pateshall v. Apthorp, Quincy 179 (Mass. 1765); Bromfield v. Little, Quincy 108
(Mass. 1764); Hanlon v. Thayer, Quincy 99 (Mass. 1764); Derumple v. Clark, Quincy 38
(Mass. 1763); Jackson v. Foye, Quincy 26 (Mass. 1762); Cooke v. Rhine, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 16
(1784).
102. See TRIAL OF ALEXANDER ADDISON 16-17, 28-31 (1803). In one Pennsylvania case,
the reporter noted that "[t]he Court were unanimous and clear in their opinion ••••" Boehm
v. Engle, 1 Dall. 15, 16 (Pa. 1767). We may infer that such unanimity was worthy of mention.
103. See, e.g., Coursey v. Wright, 1 H. & McH. 394, 395 (Md. Provincial Ct. 1771); Joce's
Lessee v. Harris, 1 H. & McH. 196, 197 (Md. Provincial Ct. 1754); Crow's Lessee v. Scott, I H.
& McH. 182, 184 (Md. Provincial Ct. 1751); Carroll's Lessee v. Llewellin, 1 H. & Mi:H. 162,
164 (Md. Provincial Ct. 1750); Cheseldine's Lessee v. Brewer, 1 H. & McH. 152, 152 (Md.
Provincial Ct. 1739); Lord Proprietary v. King, 1 H. & McH. 83, 83 (Md. Provincial Ct. 1732);
Digges's Lessee v. Coomes, 1 H. & McH. 81, 82 (Md. Provincial Ct. 1729); Robinson and
Others' Lessee v. Lloyd, 1 H. & McH. 78, 79 (Md. Provincial Ct. 1728); Robin's Lessee v.
Bush, 1 H. & McH. 50, 51 (Md. Provincial Ct. 1723); Snowden's Lessee v. Lee, 1 H. & McH.
48, 49 (Md. Provincial Ct. 1722); Sewell's Lessee v. Howard, 1 H. & McH. 45, 47 (Md. Provincial Ct. 1722).
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Of course, whenever jurors received conflicting instructions, they
were left with power to determine which judge's interpretation of the
law and the facts was correct. Even when the court's instructions
were unanimous, however, juries could not be compelled to adhere
to them. Once jurors had received evidence on several factual issues
and on the parties' possibly conflicting interpretations of the law, a
court could compel them to decide in accordance with its view of the
case only by setting aside any verdict contrary either to its statement
of the law or to the evidence. By the 1750s English courts, upon
motion of the losing party, would set aside such a verdict and order a
new trial, 104 but most eighteenth-century American jurisdictions did
not follow English practice.
In Massachusetts, Erving v. Cradock 105 made clear the court's
lack of jurisdiction to set aside a verdict contrary to its instructions.
Similarly, the Connecticut Supreme Court in the 1780s denied several new-trial motions on the ground that "[i]t doth not vitiate a verdict, that the jury have mistaken the law or the evidence: for by the
practice of this state, they are judges ofboth." 106 The Massachusetts
and Connecticut rule appears to have been followed throughout
New England. 107 Maryland and Virginia also followed the same
practice. In Maryland, the Provincial Court denied one motion in
arrest of judgment which alleged that the "Jury [had] reject[ed] law,
reason, and evidence" 108 and another motion for a new trial even
though the jury had failed to follow instructions given by the court
with the consent of both counsel. 109 In Virginia, the leading case was
the Parson's Cause, 110 although an earlier case had also declined to
104. See text at notes 85-86 supra.
105. Quincy 553 (Mass. 1761). On the new-trial motion in Massachusetts, see also W.
NELSON, supra note 58, at 27-28. In Erving, a shipowner brought an action of trespass against
a royal customs collector who had seized his vessel for sm~~ill!g and then secured its condemnation in the Court of Vice Admiralty. The collector claimed that the Vice Admiralty decree
was res judicata and a complete defense against all liability in the subsequent trespass action,
and the superior court so instructed the jury. When the jury nevertheless returned a substantial verdict for the shipowner, both the judges and the other royal officials, including Governor
Francis Bernard, agreed that the verdict was binding and could not be set aside.
106. Wittner v. Brewster, Kirby 422,423 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1788). In addition, see Carpenter v. Child, I Root 220 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1790); Pettis v. Warren, Kirby 426 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1788); Taylor v. Geary, Kirby 313 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1787); Wickham v. Waterman, Kirby 273
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1787); Woodruffv. Whittlesey, Iqrby 60 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1786).
107. Howe, supra note 90, at 591.
108. Keech's Lessee v. Dansey, I H. & McH. 20, 21 (Md. Provincial Ct. 1704).
109. Smith's Lessee v. Broughton, I H. &'McH. 33 (Md. Provincial Ct. 1714). See note 76
supra. But see Miller's Lessee v. Hynson, 1 H. & McH. 84 (Md. Provincial Ct. 1734), where
the jury attached an erroneous conclusion of law to its special factual findings. Under these
circumstances, the court set the verdict aside and ordered a new trial.
110. Reverend James Maury sued in Parson's Cause to collect that portion of salary which
the defendant, through Patrick Henry, claimed was barred by an act of the House of Burgesses.
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set aside a verdict which the defendant claimed was contrary to the
law. 111
The same rule also appears to have been followed in four other
states, although the evidence is somewhat less clear. In Proprietor v.
Keith, 112 a seventeenth-century Pennsylvania prosecution for seditious libel, the court left to the jury all issues of law and fact, including the question whether the publication was actually seditious. In a
1773 civil case in Pennsylvania, the reporter made special note of the
fact that "it was agreed by counsel, that the opinion of the court
should be conclusive to the jury" 113-a note implying that the opinion would not have been conclusive absent the agreement. In another_ case the reporter noted that "the jury were of the same
opinion" as the court, 114 thereby suggesting that juries might sometimes have been of a different view. In South Carolina, motions for
new trials on the ground that verdicts were against the law were
made on four reported occasions in the 1780s and denied without
exception, although the courts noted the special circumstances of
each case and never articulated a general rule concerning the jury's
power to determine the law. m In Georgia, the Constitution of 1777
barred judges from interfering with the jury's power to determine the
law, 116 while New Jersey did the same by statute in 1784. 117 Both
The court instructed the jury that the Burgesses' act, which had been subsequently disallowed
by the Privy Council, was void ab initio and hence that the plaintiff deserved his full salary,
but when the jury awarded damages of one penny, the court denied Maury's motion for a new
trial on the ground that the verdict contradicted the evidence. Letter from James Maury to
John Camm (Dec. 12, 1763), reprinted in J. FONTAINE, supra note 97, at 418-24.
111. Waddill v. Chamberlayne, Jeff. 10 (Va. 1735). It is unclear, however, whether the
court agreed with the jury or believed that it lacked the power to dismiss a jury verdict.
112. Reported ins. PENNYPACKER, PENNSYLVANIA COLONIAL CASES 117 (1892). See also
Testimony of Judge Edward Tilghman, supra note 97, at 27.
113. Anonymous, 1 Dall. 20, 20 (Pa. 1773).
114. Lessee of Albertson v. Robeson, I Dall. 9 (Pa. 1764). In Boehm v. Eagle, I Dall. 15,
16 (Pa. 1767), the reporter said that the '1ury was conformable to [the court's] opinion." And
in Lessee of the Proprietary v. Ralston, I Dall. 18, 19 (Pa. 1773), the reporter plainly implied
that the jury was determining the law when "[a] verdict passed for the plaintiff, by which the
sense of the jury was, that the non-performance of conditions of settlement, did not void the
grant." Cf. Hurst v. Dippo, I Dall. 20, 21 (Pa. 1774) (Chief Justice Chew stated initially that
"(i]t is a settled rule, that courts of law determine law; a jury facts," yet proceeded implicitly to
ignore his statement, see note 84 supra).
115. Steel, qui tam v. Roach, I S.C.L. (I Bay) 62 (1788); Bourke v. Bulow, 1 S.C.L. (I Bay)
49 (1787); Pledger v. Wade, I S.C.L. (1 Bay) 35 (1786); Mounier v. Meyrey, 1 S.C.L. (I Bay) 24
(1785). See also White v. McNeily, 1 S.C.L. (I Bay) I I, 12 (1784), where the jury's apportioning of damages among joint tortfeasors "was at first doubted as a deviation from the old common law rule . . . [that the] jury could not sever." The court, "upon mature consideration,"
sanctioned the verdict, but it is unclear whether the court recognized the jury's power to decide
law or simply considered the jury's verdict a better rule.
116. GA. CONST. of 1777, § 41.
117. An Act for regulating and shortening the Proceedings in the Courts of Law, ch. 32,
/
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these provisions probably confirmed pre-existing colonial practice.
Only in New York does evidence exist that judges and other informed commentators believed that a court could grant a new trial if
the jury in a civil matter ignored the law, and nearly all this evidence
arises from a single 1763 case, Forsey v. Cunningham. 118 The
supreme court denied a new trial motion in Forsey, but several of the
justices and Lieutenant Governor Cadwallader Colden all subsequently contended in letters that courts could set aside verdicts that
were against law or evidence. 119 The apparent inconsistency between the justices' statements and their action in Forsey can be resolved in several ways, 120 but whatever the inconsistency, it does not
appear that colonial New York courts routinely granted new trials in
civil cases. Indeed, acting as counsel in his own cause, Robert Livingston in 1784 denounced the new trial motion as a "new-fangled
doctrine of Lord Mansfield" and added that "no single authority was
to be found in its support, in a case of a trial at bar, by a struck jury,
in term time." 121 Other lawyers writing about New York practice in
that and the next decade still spoke with confusion about the relative
powers of court and jury, 122 and, as late as 1800, judges did not fully
agree that they could set aside a verdict against law or evidence. 123
In criminal cases, of course, King v. Zenger established the power of
§ 14 (1784), 1784 N.J. Acts 80. New Jersey's act prohibited trial courts from vacating jury
verdicts, but did make verdicts subject to reversal by the Court of Error.
118. (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1763), discussed in J. SMITH, APPEALS TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL FROM
THE AMERICAN PLANTATIONS 390-416 (1950).
119. See the statements of Judges Jones and Livingston in Report of the Case Between
Forsey and Cunningham, New-York Gazette; or, The Weekly Post-Boy, Jan. 31, 1765, at l, col.
3 and at 2, col. l; Letter from Cadwallader Colden to the Earl of Halifax (Dec. 13, 1764), supra
note 97, at 682-84.
120. Possible !!Xplanations for the New York Supreme Court's action in Forsey are (1) that
the court did not consider the verdict to be against law or evidence, and hence would not set it
aside on that ground; (2) that the court did consider the verdict to be against evidence, but held
the granting of a new trial under such conditions to be an act of discretion which it chose not to
exercise in the instant case. On the discretionary aspect of the new trial doctrine, see Wood v.
Gunston, Style 466, 82 Eng. Rep. 867 (K.B. 1655); Letter from Cadwallader Colden to the Earl
of Halifax (Dec. 13, 1764), supra note 97, at 682. Or, the court may (3) have distinguished
sharply between verdicts against evidence and excessive damages. In Forsey, the finding
against the defendant was justified and acknowledged; only the amount of compensation
which the jury ordered was contested. On this distinction, see M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 28-29 (1977).
121. J. Kent, An Address Delivered Before the Law Association of the City of New York
(Oct. 21, 1836), reprinted in (pts. 1-2) 2 CoLUM. JuR. 110, 122, at 123 (1885).
122. Compare 1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 118 (J. Goebel ed. 1964)
andW. WYCHE, supra note 79, at 168, with 1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON,
supra at 120, and W. WYCHE, supra note 79, at 176.
123. In the two cases of Wilkie v. Roosevelt, 3 Johns. Cas. 66 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1802); 3
Johns. Cas. 206 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1802), Judges Thompson, Radcliff and Kent ruled in favor of a
new trial; Chief Judge Lewis and Judge Livingston dissented. The Wilkie juries clearly expressed their feelings on the issue of vacating verdicts by thrice defying the court's instructions;
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juries to determine law as well as fact, 124 although convictions were
set aside in a few cases because juries misapplied the law. 125
Thus, the various eighteenth-century procedural devices for controlling the power of the jury were only infrequently used and partially effective. It accordingly seems safe to conclude that juries in
most, if not all, eighteenth-century American jurisdictions normally
had the power to determine law as well as fact in both civil and
criminal cases. Statements of contemporary lawyers, moreover, buttress this conclusion; Zephaniah Swift of Connecticut and Robert
Treat Paine of Massachusetts said that "[t]he jury were the proper
judges, not only of the fact but of the law that was necessarily involved" 126 in each case; that the "Jury ha[d] a right to do as they
please[d];" 127 and that "no verdicts ... [were] thrown out." 128
Even more telling, perhaps, are statements by three of the most
eminent lawyers in late eighteenth-century America-John Adams,
Thomas Jefferson, and John Jay. In the early 1770s, Adams observed in his diary: "It was never yet disputed, or doubted, that a
general Verdict, given under the .Direction of the Court in Point of
Law, was a legal Determination of the Issue." 129 Adams argued that
even a verdict contrary to the court's directions should stand, for it
was "not only ... [every juror's] right but his Duty in that Case to
find the Verdict according to his own best Understanding, Judgment
and Conscience, tho in Direct opposition to the Direction of the
Court." 130 In 1781-1782, Thomas Jefferson painted an equally broad
picture of the power of juries over the law in his Notes on Virginia.
''It is usual for the jurors to decide the fact, and to refer the law
arising on it to the decision of the judges," Jefferson wrote. "But this
division of the subject lies with their discretion only. And if the
question relate to any point of public liberty, or if it be one of those
in which the judges may be suspected of bias, the jury undertake to
after the third trial the litigants accepted the jury's perverse verdict. The case is discussed in 2
THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 122, at 228-31.
124. See J. GOEBEL & T. NAUGHTON, supra note 62, at 239-40, 278-79, 588-89, 666, 669;
see, e.g., People v. Barrett, I Johns. 66 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1806).
125. See J. GOEBEL & T. NAUGHTON, supra note 62, at 278-79; see, e.g., People v. Townsend, I Johns. Cas. 104 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1799).
126. l 2. SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 410 (1795); 2 id.
257-59 (1796).
127. Lyon v. Cobb (Bristol County Ct. of C.P. 1769), quoted in W. NELSON, supra note 58,
at 28 (argument of counsel).
128. Quincy v. Howard (Bristol County Ct. of C.P. 1770), quoted in W. NELSON, supra
note 58, at 28 (argument of counsel).
129. I LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 75, at 230 (emphasis original).
130. Id
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decide both law and fact." 131 As late as 1793, John Jay, sitting as
Chief Justice of the United States, informed a civil jury that while
the court usually determined the law and the jury found the facts,
the jury nevertheless had "a right to take upon yourselves to judge of
both, and to determine the law as well as the fact in controversy."
"[B]oth objects," Jay concluded, "are lawfully, within your power of
decision." 132
The power of juries to determine law as well as fact reveals a
great deal about many aspects of government and society in eighteenth-century America. However, I shall not explore all the inferences about the eighteenth century that historians might draw from
the law-finding power of juries. I am concerned with the efforts of
John Marshall and other early nineteenth-century judges to apply
eighteenth-century governmental techniques to the resolution of
nineteenth-century problems. Accordingly, I shall consider only
how the eighteenth-century jury's law-finding power can help us see
early nineteenth-century cases from a new perspective.
C.

Shared Values as the Basis of Eighteenth-Century Law

That eighteenth-century juries often decided cases after receiving
rudimentary, conflicting, or no instructions from the court suggests
that many jurors came to court with preconceptions about the substance of the law. This point was explicitly made in the 1788 Connecticut case of Pettis v. Warren. 133 In a black slave's suit for
freedom, one juror was challenged for having a pre-existing opinion
" 'that no negro, by the laws of this state, could be holden a slave.' "
Affirming the trial court's overruling of the challenge, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that "[a]n opinion formed and declared
upon a general principle oflaw, does not disqualify a juror to sit in a
cause in which that principle applies.'' Indeed, the court observed
that the jurors in every case could "all be challenged on one side or
the other, if having an opinion of the law in the case is ground of
challenge," 134 since, as John Adams had once noted, "[t]he general
Rules of Law and common Regulations of Society . . . [were] well
enough known to ordinary Jurors." 135 Jurors, the Connecticut court
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

T. JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 140 (J. Randolph ed. 1853).
Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 4 (1794).
Kirby 426 (Conn. Sup. Ct. 1788).
Kirby at 427.
1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 75, at 230.
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believed, were "supposed to have opinions of what the law is," since
they sat as 'judges of law as well as fact." 136
One might infer further that jurors came to the court with similar
preconceptions about the law, at least as it applied to disputes that
frequently came before them. Indeed, one cannot escape this inference without abandoning all efforts to understand how eighteenthcentury government functioned. If jurors came to court with different and possibly conflicting opinions about substantive law, one
would expect to find first, that juries had difficulty reaching unanimous verdicts and that mistrials due to hung juries were correspondingly frequent, and second, that different juries at different times
would reach different, perhaps inconsistent verdicts, thereby making
the law so uncertain and unpredictable that people could not plan
their affairs. In fact, no such evidence exists. On the contrary, the
available evidence suggests that juries had so little difficulty reaching
verdicts that they often heard and decided several cases a day. 137 No
one in the mid-eighteenth century complained about the inconsistency of the jury verdicts, and as soon as such complaints were heard
in the century's last decade, 138 the system of jury law-finding began
to disintegrate. 139
Although we have no direct evidence, most men probably did not
desire to serve as jurors. 140 At a time of difficult travel, few men
136. Kirby at 427.
137. Wroth & Zobel, Introduction, supra note 73, at xlvii. Most extant eighteenth-century
court records show that courts rarely met for terms exceeding several days and that they often
disposed of more than 100 cases during those terms, many of them by jury verdicts.
138. See R. ELLIS, supra note 17, at 190; M. HORWITZ, supra note 120, at 28;
NELSON,
supra note 58, at 165; 2 Z. SWIFT, supra note 126, at 257-59.
139. Between 1790 and 1820, courts in nearly every state for which evidence exists began to
grant motions for new trials in civil cases where juries returned verdicts contrary to law, instructions, or evidence. See THE PUBLIC STATUTE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, tit.
2, § 54 (1821); Robinson v. Adkins, 19 Ga. 398, 400-02 (1856); Bank v. Marchand, I Charil,
247 (Ga. Super. Ct. 1809); THE GENERAL PUBLIC STATUTORY LAW AND PUBLIC LOCAL LAW
OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND, ch. 42 (1790) (C. Dorsey ed. 1840); W. NELSON, supra note 58,
at 168-69; Mumford v. Smith, I Cai. R. 520 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804); Jackson v. Bowen, 1 Cai, R,
. 358 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1803); Dow v. Smith, I Cai. R. 32 (N.Y. 1803); Swearingen v. Birch, 4
Yeates 322 (Pa. 1806); Cowperthwaite v. Jones, 2 Dall. 55 (Pa. 1796); Steinmetz v. Currey, 1
Dall. 234 (Pa. 1788); Payne v. Trezevant, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 23, 32 (1790); Administrators of
Moore v. Cherry, I S.C.L. (I Bay) 267 (1792); Hawkins's Exrs. v. Berkley, I Va. (1 Wash.) 204
(1793). The routine granting of such motions deprived juries of final authority to determine
law, but it did not transfer ultimate authority to the courts, which were not authorized to grant
judgments notwithstanding the verdict in civil cases until after 1820. See Parks v. Ross, 52
U.S. (11 How.) 362 (1850); Dox v. Postmaster-General, 26 U.S. (I Pet) 318,320 (1828); Denny
v. Williams, 87 Mass. (5 Allen) I (1862); Burdick v. Green, 18 Johns. 14, 20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1820). See generally Hackett, Has a Trial Judge ofa United States Court the Right To Direct a
Verdict?, 24 YALE L. J. 127 (1914). In criminal cases,jury power over law remained extensive
well into the nineteenth century. See generally Howe, supra note 90.
140. Under eighteenth-century law,jurors were selected by one of several largely random
processes: they were chosen by lot from a list of freeholders, elected by the voters of the jurisdiction, or summoned by the sheriff from among the bystanders at court. See, e.g., 9 THE

w.

May 1978)

Constitutional Jurisprudence

919

would have cared to attend court sessions, and those who ~id probably were pursuing business interests from which jury duty was an
unwelcome distraction. In short, there is every reason to think that
eighteenth-century citizens avoided jury duty as eagerly as citizens
today and that the chore was therefore distributed among as much of
the eligible population as could be conscripted. 141 Although some
groups (notably women, blacks, servants, religious dissenters, and
anyone who did not own land or pay taxes) may have been systematically excluded from juries, 142 it does not seem unreasonable to infer
that juries contained a random and representative cross section of
the remaining population. 143
That conclusion suggests a final inference. If juries in fact mirrored the white, male, landowning, and taxpaying population, and if
upon coming to court nearly all jurors shared similar ideas about the
substance of the law, then perhaps a body of shared ideas about law
permeated a large segment of the population of every territory over
which a court that sat with a jury had jurisdiction. Colonial government may have been able to derive policies from and otherwise function on the basis of those shared values.
Those who live amidst the twentieth-century cacophony of conflicting interests may find it difficult to imagine how a government
acting only in the absence of serious conflict could ever function effectively. The eighteenth-century Anglo-American world, however,
was sufficiently different from our own so that government in that
era might have so functioned.
PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT, supra note 98, at 45-46 (records of 1744);
18 THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, supra note 98, at 144-57 (records of
1756); 3 THE COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK, supra note 98, at 185-92 (records of 1741); 3
THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 98, at 274-81 (records of 1731); 3
THE STATUTES AT LARGE: BEING A COLLECTION OF THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 98, at
369-70 (records of 1704); 5 id. at 24-26 (records of 1738); 5 id. at 523-36 (records of 1748); 5 id.
at 544-45 (records of 1748); 3 THE LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 75, at 17-18.
141. The one available local study indicates, in fact, that between one-fourth and one-third
of all adult males served on juries. See Nelson, Introductory Essay, The Larger Context of
Litigation in Plymouth County 1725-1825, in 1 LEGAL RECORDS OF PLYMOUTH COUNTY 16861859, at 25 (D. Konig ed. 1978).
142. On the property and tax requirements for service on juries, see 5 THE PUBLIC
RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT, supra note 98, at 240 (records of 1711); 9 id. at
45 (records of 1744); 9 id. at 247 (records of 1746); 1 THE COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK,
supra note 98, at 387 (records of 1699); 3 id. at 185 (records of 1741); 3 THE STATUTES AT
LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 98, at 274-82 (records of 1731); 5 THE STATUTES AT
LARGE: BEING A COLLECTION OF THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 98, at 24-25 (records of
1738); id. at 489-91 (records of 1748); id. at 525 (records of 1748); id. at 544-45 (records of
1748). See also A. PORTER, COUNTY GOVERNMENT IN VIRGINIA 49 (1947). On exclusion of
dissenters from juries, see W. NELSON, supra note 58, at 113; Nelson, supra note 141, at 25.
143. Cf. C. WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFRAGE 20-39 (1960), which concludes that between one-half and three-fourths of all adult white males were qualified to vote in most localities in eighteenth-century America.
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Several differences should be noted. First, the primitive character of the economy meant that most communities could afford only a
few salaried officeholders. 144 Indeed, many men did not have
enough wealth and time even to participate in elections "without
manifest injury to their crops." 145 As a result, competition for local
leadership positions was often understandably slight, 146 and local
governments lacked substantial salaried bureaucracies that could enforce decisions. Part-time police officials such as deputy sheriffs and
constables enforced government decisions, so long, that is, as they
did not contravene the wishes of neighbors with whom they had
close economic and social ties. 147 The ultimate enforcement
body-the militia-was merely the community itself organized as a
quasi-military body that would, of course, not act against the community's wishes. Colonial economic conditions, in short, reduced
conflict and competition in local politics and precluded the rise of
coercive institutions that might have been used by one portion of a
community seeking to promote its interests at the expense of others.
Second, colonial American communities differed tremendously.
Religion remained important in eighteenth-century life, and
America could afford room for almost any religious community. 148
Religious differences were not the only ones among the communities. Important economic differences also existed, for while most
communities were agricultural, some were either mercantile or
chiefly engaged in fishing. Finally, inarticulable differences in lifestyle and ambience distinguished communities, as any visitor of the
restored colonial towns of Sturbridge, Massachusetts, and Williams144. Virginia justices, for example, received neither salary nor fee for their services. See C.
SYDNOR, GENTLEMEN FREEHOLDERS, supra note 58, at 84. The fees paid to Massachusetts
judges and judicial officers were not particularly high either. See Wroth & Zobel,
Introduction, supra note 73, at lxix-lxxi.
145. Freeholders' Appeal to the Governor, quoted in C. SYDNOR, GENTLEMEN FREEHOLDERS, supra note 58, at 33.
146. That local officials had to be compelled by law to serve evinces the lack of competition for many local offices. See W. NELSON, supra note 58, at 38. q: Greenberg, The Effectiveness ofLaw Enforcement in Eighteenth-Century New York, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HlsT. 173, 174-86
(1975)(finding qualified men willing to serve as law enforcement officers was difficult). At
times, even legislative elections were not competitive. See P. BONOMI, supra note 58, at 190.
147. See Greenberg, supra note 146, at 175-79; Nelson, The Legal Restraint of Power in
Pre-Revolutionary America: Massachusells as a Case Study, 1760-1775, 18 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
1, 7-9, 30-32 (1974).
148. Puritan communities prevailed, of course, in New England, as Anglican communities
did throughout the South, but Dutch Calvinists established communities in New York,
Quakers settled in Pennsylvania, and Baptists and Presbyterians scattered communities along
the frontier. Other sorts of Protestant communities also existed, as well as Roman Catholic
communities in Maryland and even a Jewish community in New York. See H. GRINSTEIN,
THE RISE OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY OF NEW YORK, 1654-1860 (1945); H. Browne, Catholicism in the United Stales, in THE SHAPING OF AMERICAN RELIGION 72, 74-75 (1961).
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burg, Virginia, can see,. or as any reader of the diaries of eighteenthcentury travellers like Dr. Alexander Hamilton can learn. 149
Colonials did not find it especially difficult to change their residence from one community to another. Benjamin Franklin, for example, moved from Boston to Philadelphia with relative ease, 150
while thousands of colonial Americans found the move from established towns to the frontier not at all insuperable. 151 As a result,
most colonials who dissented from their own community's conception of right and justice could move without great difficulty to a
more congenial community. Newly arriving immigrants were also
able to identify and settle in communities that welcomed their religious beliefs, lifestyles, and economic skills. 152 The tendency of people to live in communities they found congenial was important,
particularly because it enabled communities to retain their identity
by facilitating the departure of those whose personal ethical codes
would have diluted that identity.
But while colonial Americans could readily move between communities, they generally seem not to have established the kind of
sustained intercommunity contact likely to produce conflict. American communities had long since abandoned schemes of subjugating
each other or seizing each other's wealth; the Dutch of Manhattan
and the Puritans of Long Island, for example, learned how to coexist
when they each abandoned thoughts of conquest and developed
their primary social and economic communication with their respective compatriots in the Hudson Valley and in New England rather
than with each other. 153 The availability ofland, 154 which made territorial quarrels unnecessary, and the lack of a developed transporta149. See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, GENTLEMEN'S PROGRESS (C. Bridenbaugh ed. 1948).
150. See C. VAN DOREN, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 37-44 (1938).
151. C. GRANT, DEMOCRACY IN THE CONNECTICUT FRONTIER TOWN OF KENT 28-103
(1961), discusses one example of the ease of settlement. In particular, Grant shows that in the
22 years following Kent's founding in 1738, 772 different men bought land in the town, 61% of
whom took up residence. Id at 56.
152. News of the different colonies' willingness to receive immigrants filtered back to Europe in vast quantities. See M. HANSEN, THE ATLANTIC MIGRATION, 1607-1860, at 32-52
(1940); Conway, Welsh Emigration to the United States, in 7 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HisTORY 175, 185-88 (1973); Kollmann & Marschalck, German Emigration to the United States, in
7 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 497, 512-15 (1973); Schelbert, On Becoming an Emigrant: A Structural View ofEighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Swiss IJata, in 7 PERSPECTIVES
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 439, 464-67, 477-80 (1973).
153. See D. Fox, YANKEES AND YORKERS 57-151 (1940).
154. See M. HANSEN, supra note 152, at 45. Until the middle of the eighteenth century,
even the smaller and older colonies like Connecticut had free land on which new towns could
be founded. See C. GRANT, supra note 15 I, at 3-1 I.
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tion and communication network, 155 which made sustained contact
difficult, also help account for the infrequency of disputes between
communities. Geographically proximate communities were thus
able to remain distinct, 156 to pursue their own conception of right,
and to avoid intercommunity disputes which legal institutions dependent on local community support would have been incapable of
resolving. 157
Finally, colonial politics existed within an established constitutional structure which colonials could not control. Parliament, in
which colonials had no direct voice, alone possessed the power to
decide many fundamental social and economic issues, and for the
first sixty years of the eighteenth century it was willing to abide
by decisions reached in the preceding century which were often
favorable to the colonies. Thus, much of the grist for genuine political conflict was removed from the realm of imperial politics; absent a
radical restructuring of the Anglo-American system, there was simply no point in building a political organization around the issue
whether, for example, Anglicans would be tolerated in Massachusetts158 or whether Americans would be free to trade with French
Canada without restriction. 159
Provincial politics were not radically different. Americans controlled their colonial legislatures, but they could not effectively enact
legislation that significantly altered the structure of colonial society
since such legislation would almost always be vetoed by a colonial
governor or by London. 160 As a result, colonial legislation usually
consisted of mere administration: raising and appropriating small
amounts of tax money, distributing the even smaller amounts of government largess, and legislating as necessary to keep the few governmental institutions functioning. 161 While provincial political conflict
commonly occurred, it rarely involved important social issues. 162 Of
155. See C. NEITELS, THE EMERGENCE OF A NATIONAL ECONOMY, 1775-1815, at 38-40
(1962).
156. See P. BONOMI, supra note 58, at 24-28.
157. For one example of the inability of outsiders to obtain justice from local legal institutions, see id. at 51.
158. Pressure from London forced Massachusetts to treat Anglicans as a separate denomination exempt from religious taxation. See C. BRIDENBAUGH, MITRE AND SCEPTRE 73-74
(1962).
159. The Navigation Acts, of course, prohibited trade between the colonies and French
Canada. See note 62 supra.
160. For example, English authorities overrode Massachusetts' land-bank legislation. See
J. SCHUTZ, WILLIAM SHIRLEY, KING'S GOVERNOR OF MASSACHUSETTS 40 (1961).
161. See W. NELSON, supra note 58, at 14.
162. See generally B. BAILYN, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1968); s. KATZ,
NEWCASTLE'S NEW YORK 44-58 (1968); J. SCHUTZ, supra note 160.
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course, occasional conflicts grew from. religious differences, such as
the division in Pennsylvania politics between Quaker and antiQuaker parties, 163 and from the rivalry between seaboard and
backcountry areas, such as the 1740s land-bank dispute in Massachusetts164 and the 1760s Regulator Movement in the Carolinas. 165
But since these disputes could not be locally resolved within the British power structure, they quickly degenerated into mere personal
and factional conflicts between men seeking personal advancement.166 Provincial political conflict may have been widespread, but
as shrewdly observant colonial political writers vehemently announced, it departed from the ideal polity of consensus 167-a polity
that may have existed in many eighteenth-century local communities.
Taken together, these facts may have helped to sustain a political
order in colonial America radically different from the political order
of America today. The stable imperial constitution combined with
primitive colonial economies to remove most social and economic
issues from imperial and provincial politics. Before Independence,
most newly arising socioeconomic conflicts were resolved and new
socioeconomic decisions taken at the local level. The primitiveness
of the colonial economy had another influence: by keeping the social
elite small and depriving it of effective military and bureaucratic
power necessary to coerce the people at large, the colonial American
economic system denied colonial leaders the opportunity to exploit
their localities in their own self-interest. Colonial leaders generally
had to govern and resolve social tensions according to values commonly accepted in their localities. Finally, the real differences between localities and the ease with which people could move to a
community whose ideas they shared preserved each community's
distinct .identity. As a result, the colonial American polity may on
the whole have consisted of a series of local communities whose inhabitants jointly defined standards of right and justice and insured
that the community lived by those standards.
But it is unnecessary for purposes of this essay to insist upon this
portrait of eighteenth-century America, especially since other evidence suggests that any such communitarian social order had at least
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

See J. HUTSON, PENNSYLVANIA POLITICS, 1746-1770, at 130 (1972).
See J. SCHUTZ, supra note 160, at 37-40.
See R. BROWN, THE SOUTH CAROLINA REGULATORS 38-63 (1963).
See J. HUTSON, supra note 163, at 130-77; J. SCHUTZ, supra note 160, at 48-57, 62-63.
See B. BAILYN, supra note 162, at 64-65.
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partially broken down. 168 Nor need this essay insist that colonial
government functioned according to shared values with more than a
minimal effectiveness. The only important point is that a consensus
style of government was intimately known to mid-eighteenth-century Americans on a routine, day-to-day basis. An individual litigant, a special interest group, a high provincial official, even a judge,
often could elicit a particular court decision or attain a long-term
policy only if he could persuade the cross section of his community
that acted as jurors, and his attempts at persuasion must almost invariably have required appeals to values he and the jurors shared.
Since eighteenth-century juries rarely could be circumvented or coerced, there was normally no other way to proceed.
Of course, lawyers, judges, officials, and litigants did not always
find common values which could support decisions. They may often
have failed, and their failures may have sensitized them to the instability inherent in processes of government by consensus. Nevertheless, the mid-eighteenth-century statesman typically governed, the
lawyer practiced, and the litigant argued, by molding and appealing
to a consensus of shared values. It was in this style of government
and legal practice that John Marshall and other statesmen, judges,
and lawyers of his generation first learned their professions.

II. THE

BIRTH OF NATIONAL PARTY CONFLICT

At the outset of the War of Independence, most rebelling colonists aimed not so much to change as to preserve the basic structure
of their political system. In particular, most Americans wished to
preserve a political order which generally required officials to govern
according to common values or principles which nearly all citizens
accepted as right or otherwise legitimate. 169 • Nevertheless, independence significantly reshaped American politics by introducing a new
political style in stark contrast to the mid-eighteenth-century style of
government by consensus.
Independence destroyed the stability of the imperial system. No
longer were fundamental questions such as the distribution of power
among various levels of government, the continuance of religious establishments, and the freedom of American merchants to trade
abroad resolved by an imperial law which the colonies had little di168. See Nelson, supra note 141; Gordon, Book Review, 51 N.Y.U.L. REV, 686, 687-90
(1976); Murrin, Review Essay, 11 HIST. & THEORY 226, 245-57 (1972); Wroth, Review Essay,
15 AM. J, LEGAL HIST. 318 (1971).
169. See B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 94-95,
102-09, 118-21, 160-62, 188-90, 202-05 (1967); W. NELSON, supra note 58, at 67.
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rect power to control. Independence compelled Americans to resolve such questions anew, and to do so nationally rather than
locally. The post-Revolutionary generation's grapplings with these
questions portended social discord in both state and national politics
and during the last two decades of the eighteenth century provoked
some of the most vituperative conflict in American political history.
The revolutionary struggle and the attainment of independence
also transformed American society and politics ideologically. In discarding British rule and reconstituting their governments, Americans
proclaimed that all law springs from popular will, at least insofar as
elected representatives express popular will in legislation. If the people could remake their government, it followed that their lawmaking
power must be "original, inherent, and unlimited by human authority."170 In short, the Revolution convinced many Americans that
popular will was "the only rational source of power'' 171 and that
there was "an original, underived and incommunicable authority
and supremacy in the collective body of the people to whom all delegated power must submit and from whom there is no appeal." 172
This concept of legislation as the creation of new law by the people or their representatives proved practically significant after independence because groups such as religious dissenters and westward
expansionists used it to promote their interests. Before the Revolution, policies imposed by London had tended to restrict westward
expansion 173 and to require that dissenters support the established
churches. 174 Once independent Americans could formulate their
own policies, however, both religious dissenters and westward expansionists campaigned to revise established policies. Legislatures
frequently responded by changing inherited rules and practices, 175
and in the process changed themselves as well. By enacting new law,
legislatures reinforced the ideology of popular lawmaking power and
forged an active, creative legislative process in lieu of one which depended on the derivation of rules from preexisting principles.
T1:rls transformation occurred, however, in a society unprepared
170. [Baltimore] Maryland Journal, Feb. 20, 1787, quoted in G. WooD, supra note 91, at
371. See also id at 368.
171. Zabdiel Adams, Sermon Preached Before . . . the Senate and House of Representatives of the Co=onwealth of Massachusetts, May 29, 1782, at 20 (Boston 1782).
172. [Hartford] Connecticut Courant & Weekly Intelligence, Aug. 12, 1783, at 2, col. 3.
173. P. GATES, HISTORY OF Puauc LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 34 (1968).
174. See P. MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND lN AMERICA 36-43, 66-72 (1965).
175. Soon after the Revolution, Virginia, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts passed legislation to protect squatters' rights in western lands. P. GATES, supra note 173,
at 66-67.
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to abandon blithely the pre-Revolutionary ideal that human law
must conform to fundamental principles of divine or natural law.
The older ideal persisted throughout the late 1770s and the 1780s.
After all, as Edmund Randolph observed in retrospect, "theoretic
reasoning" had brought about the Revolution itself. 176 Post-Revolutionary Americans continued to maintain that they could rationally
"define the rights of nature" and learn "how to search into, to distinguish, and to comprehend, the principles of physical, moral, religious, and civil liberty." 177 Believing in "eternal principles of social
justice," 178 American political thinkers of the 1780s continued to object to legislation "founded not upon the principles of Justice, but
upon the Right of the Sword" and to legislation for which "no other
Reason can be given . . . than because the Legislature had the
Power and Will to enact such a Law." 179 They believed that legislatures which enacted laws that "violate[d] ... fundamental principles . . . [were] substituting power for right." 180 Thinkers like
Madison, arguing at the time of the Constitutional Convention for a
congressional power to negate state legislation, noted that America
needed "some disinterested & dispassionate umpire" to control "disputes between different passions & interests in the State[s]." 181
In short, many Americans believed after the Revolution that government should articulate and apply fundamental principles dispassionately, neutrally, and objectively, rather than yield to a mere
electoral majority. Some, like Madison, thought that legislatures,
not courts, should guard fundamental legal principles, while others,
like Hamilton, argued that courts as well as legislatures should do
so.1 82 But, since courts throughout the 1780s were still generally considered an undifferentiated segment of the executive branch, the important issue for that decade was not whether the legislative,
executive or the judicial branch should ensure the conformity of law
176. E. RANDOLPH, MANUSCRIPT HISTORY OF VIRGINIA, quoted in G. WOOD., supra note
91, at 4.
177. W. PIERCE, AN ORATION, DELIVERED AT CHRIST CHURCH, SAVANNAH, ON THE 4TH
JULY, 1788, IN COMMEMORATION OF THE ANNIVERSARY OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 6 (Savannah 1788).
178. 3 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 550 (H. Syrett & J. Cooke eds. 1962) (Hamilton's Second Letter from Phocion [1784]).
179. Petition of Salem, Oct. 12, 1784, quoted in McCORMICK, NEW JERSEY IN THE CR!TI·
CAL PERIOD 183, cited in G. WOOD, supra note 91, at 406 n.22.
180. Providence [R.I.J Gazette & Country Journal, Aug. 5, 1786, at 2, col. 2.
181. 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 346 (G. Hunt ed. 1901) (leller to G. Washington, April 16, 1787).
182. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton).
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to fundamental standards of right, but whether any institution
should.
At times during that decade, legislatures were asked to protect
those fundamental standards. Arguments were made against legislation such as a Virginia act which condemned to death an alleged
highway robber "without any proof better than vague reports . . . [,]
without being confronted with his accusers and witnesses, [and]
without the privilege of calling for evidence in his behalf . . . ." 183
To those who believed that law must adhere to immutable principles
that transcend popular will, "this arbitrary deprivation of life, the
dearest gift of God to man," was neither "consistent with the genius
of republican government" nor "compatible with the spirit of freedom"; they could "not contemplate it without horror." 184 Others responded that the collective body of the people possessed "plenary
power" to make law; if the people were to exercise an "unlimited
power to do right," then they must also have "an unlimited power to
do wrong." 185 Granting any group of men the power to nullify acts
of the people, the argument added, "would be more despotic than
the Roman Decemvirate," for who could then "check or control"
those men. 186
At other times during the 1780s the courts heard demands for the
protection of fundamental rights in cases akin to modem requests for
judicial review. In four reported cases from North Carolina, Rhode
Island, and Virginia, 187 courts asserted the power to invalidate unconstitutional legislation; in two other cases from New York and
South Carolina, 188 they effectively struck down statutes under the
guise of interpretation. Massachusetts and New Hampshire courts
183. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 66-67 (2d ed. J. Elliot 1836) [hereinafter cited as DEBATES). The
Virginia act is discussed in 2 W. CROSSKEY, supra note 9, at 945-47, who contends that the
robber was executed not pursuant to the legislative act, but pursuant to a jury verdict returned
on a criminal indictment.
184. 3 DEBATES, supra note 183, at 67.
185. Webster, Government, l AM. MAG. 75-76 (1787-1788).
186. Letter from Richard D. Spaight to James Iredell (Aug. 12, 1757), reprinted in 2 G.
MCREE, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 168, 169 (New York 1857). The
quoted statement was made by Richard Spraight, while a delegate at the Constitutional Convention, in reference to Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. (1 Mart.) 42 (1787), which had earlier
occasioned debate in the North Carolina legislature. See 2 W. CROSSKEY, supra note 9, at
971-73.
187. Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. (1 Mart.) 42 (1787); Trevett v. Weeden, Varnum 1 (R.I.
1787); Cases of the Judges, 8 Va. (4 Call) 135 (1788); Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5
(1782).
188. Rutgers v. Waddington (N.Y. Mayor's Ct. 1784), reprinted in MAYOR'S COURT OF
New YORK CITY, supra note 83, at 302, 323-26; Ham v. McClaws, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 93 (1789).
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also held legislative acts unconstitutional in unreported cases. 189 In
most of these cases, advocates of the people's transcendent power to
make law in their legislatures debated adherents to the older notions
of the inherent rightness and immutability of law. In Rutgers v.
Waddington, 190 for example, the "supremacy of the Legislature ...
positively to enact a law" 191 was pitted against "the rights of human
nature" and the "law of nature." 192 Similarly, in Trevett v.
Weeden 193 a Rhode Island act that penalized without jury trial anyone who refused to accept the state's paper currency was challenged
as "contrary to the laws of nature" 194 and violative of the "fundamental right" of "trial by jury." 19s
Until the 1790s, however, the line between believers in popular
sovereignty and believers in supreme fixed principles was rarely so
plainly drawn. One could still believe simultaneously in the people's
power to make law and in the immutability of the principles underlying law. Although it appreciated and accepted popular lawmaking, the ·Revolutionary generation did not abandon older notions
that law made by the people must not violate rights which Americans had proclaimed immutably theirs in the struggle with
England.I 96 New and old ideas coexisted as the Revolutionary generation, believing in the people's inherent goodness, simply assumed
that all laws made by the people would be consistent with fundamental rights.
During the 1790s, however, this ambivalent legal ideology
proved merely transitory and diverged into two clearer, more coherent points of view. One sought to resolve all issues according to the
189. On the basis of a 1788 letter from J.B. Cutting to Thomas Jefferson, the Massachusetts
case was initially identified as Brattle v. Hinckley (Sup. Jud. Ct., Worcester, Sept. Term, 1786),
The court in that case, however, did not hold a legislative act unconstitutional, and none of the
surviving records of the case indicate whether the court asserted its power of judicial review.
Goodell, An Early Constitutional Case in Massachusells, 1 HARv. L. REv. 41S, 416 (1894).
Professor Crosskey has accordingly described the Massachusetts case as one "which seems
never to have occurred." 2 W. CROSSKEY, supra note 9, at 961-62. However, in Goddard v.
Goddard (Sup. Jud. Ct., Suffolk, Feb. Term, 1789) the highest court of Massachusetts did, in
fact, hold unconstitutional a legislative resolution reinstating a previously decided action in the
court's docket. There were at least two unreported cases in New Hampshire in which the
courts held void legislative acts changing the right to jury trial. These cases are discussed in 2
W. CROSSKEY, supra note 9, at 968-71.
190. (N.Y. Mayor's Ct. 1784), reprinted in MAYOR'S COURT OF NEW YORK CITY, supra
note 83, at 302.
191. Reprinted in MAYOR'S COURT OF NEW YORK CITY, supra note 83, at 323.
192. Reprinted in MAYOR'S COURT OF NEW YORK CITY, supra note 83, at 312.
193. J. VARNUM, THE CASE, TREVETT AGAINST WEEDEN (Providence 1787).
194. Id. at 29.
19S. Id. at 11.
196. See G. Wooo, supra note 91, at S3-70, 291-30S.
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will of the people and the other sought to resolve them according to
fixed principles of law. The appearance of these competing ideologies was closely related to the division in American politics in the
1790s between Federalists, who generally viewed law as a reflection
of fixed and transcendent principles, and Republicans, who considered it the embodiment of popular will.
Future Federalists and Republicans first divided over the seemingly trivial issue of the chief executive's title. 197 Then, Hamilton's
economic program, particularly the funding of the national debt and
the creation of a national bank, stirred a more significant controversy.198 However, historians generally agree that the first truly national political organizations arose in the mid-l 790s in response to
the French Revolution 199 and the signing of Jay's Treaty with Great
Britain. 200 These two events forced Americans to choose sides in the
worldwide struggle between Britain and France that began in 1793,
and for many the choice posed difficult ideological issues. Some
Americans found themselves horrified by the excesses of the French
Revolution during the early 1790s and by its culmination in the
Reign of Terror; othe.r:s, while not approving of the death and violence, remained convinced that the French republican movement
would ultimately warrant American sympathy.
The political divisions of the mid-1790's reflected domestic concerns as well. For example, the Federalists saw in Jefferson and the
Republicans many of the threats to religion, to life, and to property
that they found so horrifying in French revolutionaries. The election
of 1800, they feared, would require voters to select either
"GOD-AND A RELIGIOUS PRESIDENT; or impiously declare
for JEFFERSON-AND NO GOD!!!" 201 This widespread Federalist concern over Jefferson's lack of traditional religious belief2°2
197. For a discussion of this controversy, see J. MILLER, THE FEDERALIST ERA 1789-1801,
at 6-10 (1960).
198. See J. CHARLES, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM 83, 116-18 (1956);
N. CUNNINGHAM, THE JEFFERSONIAN REPUBLICANS 8-9, 50-54 (1957); J. MILLER, supra note
197, at 99-101.
199. For a discussion of the national parties' reaction to the French Revolution, see J.
MILLER, supra note 197, at 127-39. R. BEEMAN, THE OLD DOMINION AND THE NEW NATION,
1788-1801, at 119-37 (1972), discusses the reaction of Virginia.
200. See J. CHARLES, supra note 198, at 83, 116-18; R. HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A
PARTY SYSTEM 88-90 (1969); Goodman, The First American Party System, in THE AMERICAN
PARTY SYSTEMS 56, 74-75 (2d ed. W. Chambers & W. Burnham 1975). See generally N. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 198, at 54-66, 77-85. The literature on Jay's Treaty is vast. For a general
overview, see J. MILLER, supra note 197, at 164-79.
201. Campaign placard, quoted in J. MILLER, supra note 197, at 265 n.34.
202. See Letter from A. Hamilton to J. Jay (May 7, 1800), reprinted in 8 THE WORKS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 549 (H. Lodge ed. 1886); w. LINN, SERIOUS CONSIDERATIONS ON THE
ELECTION OF A PRESIDENT ADDRESSED TO THE CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES 24 (1800);
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gained credence from the efforts of prominent elements in the Jeffersonian coalition in states such as Massachusetts and Virginia to pull
down the religious orders those states had erected at their earliest
settlements. 203 For men who lived in an age which had had little
experience with societies that had maintained their stability without
the assistance of an established church, it was plausible to fear that if
"the restraints ofreligion [were] once broken down, as they infallibly
would be, by leaving the subject of public worship to the humors of
the multitude, . . . we might well defy all human wisdom and
power, to support and preserve order and government in the
State[s]."204
If the Federalists were convinced that conferral of power upon
Republicans would subvert morality and lead to violence and anarchy, the Republicans were equally convinced that, if allowed to retain power, the Federalists would subvert republican liberties and
rule autocratically. Their fear of a Federalist conspiracy to pervert
American liberties did not end in 1795; they most feared certain occurrences during the Adams Administration,205 such as the passage
of the Alien and Sedition Acts, the imposition of a direct tax, and the
establishment of a standing army and navy.
In short, clear-cut party divisions had emerged by the second half
of the 1790s. On one side stood the Republicans, avowing "the docBoston Repertory, March 9, 1804, quoted in J. BANNER, To THE HARTFORD CONVENTION
1789-1815, at 27 n.9 (1970).
203. For a discussion of Republicanism and the dissenting sects in Massachusetts, see P.
GOODMAN, THE DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICANS OF MASSACHUSETTS 86-96 (1964). See generally
J. BANNER, To THE HARTFORD CONVENTION 1789-1815, at 197-215 (1970). But see id. at 210,
stating that the dissenter/Republican alliance was "unstable" and "a triumph . . . of expediency over principle." Madison sought the support of Virginia Baptists and attempted to persuade eastern (Episcopalian) Virginians to join the dissenting sects' movement to force the sale
of church glebe lands. The Republican aid in the cause was acknowledged in the election of
1800. See R. BEEMAN, supra note 199, at 93-95, 198-99.
204. Election sermon by Phillips Payson, quoted in I. BACKUS, Government and Liberty
.Described; and Ecclesiastical 7yranny Exposed, in ISAAC BACKUS ON CHURCH, STATE, AND
CALVINISM 353 (W. McLoughlin ed. 1968).
205. The Federalists ena~ed a sedition law during that administration that "protect(ed)
corrupt magistrates and public defaulters," Philadelphia Aurora, Oct. 14, 1800, while consigning "native Americans . • . to loathsome prisons for exercising the constitutional right of
public enquiry." Joseph Bloomfield (chairman of the state Republican co=ittee) to the People of New Jersey, (Sept. 30, 1800) (broadside, quoted in N. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 198, at
215). They also imposed "a direct tax, with heavy imposts," the Republicans charged, to "support •.• an army in time of peace" as well as "an expensive and ineffectual navy." Id. Finally, they enlisted "Priests and Judges . . . for political purposes, . . . equally polluting the
holy altars of religion, and the seats of Justice," thereby threatening to institutionalize "[a)n
established church, a religious test, and an order of Priesthood." Philadelphia Aurora, Oct. 14,

1800.
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trine that mankind are capable of governing themselves," 206 and accused by their opponents of scheming "to introduce a new order of
things as it repects morals and politics, social and civil duties." 207
Opposite them stood the Federalists, claiming to preserve "that virtue [which] is the only permanent basis of a Republic," 208 and accused of attempting to restore monarchical government. Both
parties were internally divided, 209 of course, and not everyone adhered rigidly to his party's ideology. Some statesmen continued to
believe that popular will did not inevitably conflict with fundamental standards of right and that law and governmental policy could
accordingly reflect both.210 Nonetheless, when forced to choose,
those who styled themselves Federalists generally proclaimed their
preference for customary standards, while those who saw themselves
as Republicans generally proclaimed their allegiance to the people's
will.
These two competing political theories were deeply rooted in still
fresh American political experiences; they responded to ardently felt
political needs. Republicans in 1800 could look back upon a quarter-century of fervid political activity during which a majority of the
people had transformed the American constitutional landscape. In
light of this, Republicans could plausibly hope that the popular majority would secure revolutionary improvements in government
through continued exertion. Federalists, on the other hand, looked
back on a different governmental tradition. They focussed upon the
workings of local government which, even after twenty-five years of
revolutionary transformation, continued to function without falling
under the arbitrary control of those in positions of power. Federalists recognized a tradition, that is, of government by customary
norms whose validity all right-thinking men accepted. That such
traditional government seemed under attack in 1800 and unable to
resolve every political issue was not startling; eighteenth-century
government-by-consensus had always been somewhat unstable and
unequipped to resolve all problems. Nevertheless, it had succeeded
206. 6 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 181, at 118 (Letter to Randolph, Sept. 13,
1792).
207. Daggett, Sunbeams May Be Extractedfrom Cucumbers, but the Process Is Tedious
[1799), in THE RISING GLORY OF AMERICA 184 (G. Wood ed. 1971).
208. [Boston] New-England Palladium, April 1, 1806, at 2, col. 3, quoted in J. BANNER,
supra note 203, at 26.
209. See R. ELLIS, supra note 17, at 19, 53. See generally M. DAUER, supra note 54.
210. Among these people were John Jay, George Cabot, Thomas Truxton, Theodore
Sedgwick, and William Cooper. See D. FISCHER, THE REVOLUTION OF AMERICAN CONSERVATISM 1-17 (1965).
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in many matters, and even its partial success offered hope to those in
1800 who dreaded government solely by majority will.

Ill.

MARSHALL'S OFFER OF COMPROMISE: THE SEPARATION OF
LAW FROM POLITICS

The political struggle between Federalists and Republicans is
centrally important to understanding John Marshall's constitutional
jurisprudence. Marshall became Chief Justice at that struggle's
height, just when Thomas Jefferson was finally elected President of
the United States. Marshall, once a Federalist congressional leader
and an active member of John Adams' administration, was immersed in the politics of the time. 211 Hence, his views about the election of 1800 and the conflict leading to it merit discussion.
Marshall, of course, was a traditionalist who believed in natural
rights that Pfe-existed government and legislation. In his clearest
statement from the bench, an 1827 dissent in Ogden v. Saunders, 212
Marshall argued that "the right to contract, and the obligations created by contract ... exist anterior to, and independent of society[:]
... Ithey] are, like many other natural rights, brought with man into
society; and, although they may be controlled, are not given by
human legislation."213 Similarly, in Fletcher v. Peck214 he spoke of
"certain great principles of justice, whose authority is universally acknowledged . . . ."215 Earlier, he had affirmed to the Virginia convention that ratified the federal constitution his belief in the
"observance" of "certain maxims-. . . certain fundamental principles, from which a free people ought never to depart." 216
Marshall discussed the political divisions of the 1790s in later
writings, notably his 1807 biography of Washington and an 1827 autobiographical letter to Justice Story. He "recollect[ed] the wild and
enthusiastic democracy ... of that [earlier] day ... which brought
annually into doubt principles which I thought most sound, [and]
which prov€?d that everything was afloat, and that we had no safe
anchorage ground." 217 He recalled that "two great parties were
211. On Marshall's political career during !he Washington and Adams administrations, see
2 A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 14.
212. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
213. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 345.
214. IO U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
215. IO U.S. (6 Cranch) at 133.
216. 3 DEBATES, supra note 183, at 222-23.
217. AN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH BY JOHN MARSHALL 9, IO (J. Adams ed. 1937).
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formed in every state."218 One, which sought to remedy society's ills
through legislation, produced "uncertainty with respect to measures
of great importance to every member of the community, [and] ...
instability in principles which ought if possible to be rendered immutable . . . ."219 The other, whose members were "the uniform
friends of a regular administration of justice," supported "the principles of moral justice."220 However, Marshall belonged to the moderate Adams wing of the Federalist Party,221 and, despite his
conservatism and his belief in immutable principles of justice, he
recognized better than his more extreme Federalist brethren that no
American statesman could or should ignore the people's will. Thus,
he told the Virginia ratification convention that he "idolize[d] democracy" as the "best means of protecting liberty."222 A decade
later in 1798 he still believed that "the best rule for freemen . . . was
... obedience to laws enacted by a majority" 223 and accordingly
promised in his congressional campaign that he would, if "chosen to
represent the district, obey the voice of ... [his] constituents." 224
The goal, and the opportunity, for a moderate judge like Marshall was to reconcile the people's transcendent power with the law's
immutable principles; that is, to reconcile the newer style of government by majority will with the older but still vital style of government by consensus. The need for reconciliation was especially
urgent for Marshall because he found himself after 1800 at the head
of a branch of government-the judiciary-which was being subjected for the first time in American history to a sustained attack not
simply by transient mobs or occasional pamphleteers, but by duly
elected representatives of the majority of the people in the legislature
and the executive.
In the early years of Marshall's tenure on the bench, members of
the Republican party warned that any attempt "of federalism to exalt the Judiciary over the Executive and Legislature, and to give that
favorite department a political character & influence ... [would]
terminate in the degradation and disgrace of the judiciary."225 That
218. 5 J. MARSHALL, THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 85 (1807).
219. Id. at 87.
220. Id. at 85.
221. See M. DAUER, supra note 54, at 163, 236-37.
222. 3 DEBATES, supra note 183, at 222.
223. Address of the Minority: J oumal of Virginia House of Delegates 88-90 (Dec. 1798),
quoted in 2 A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 14, at 402.
224. Marshall's Answers to Freeholder's Questions (Sept. 20, 1798), reprinted in JOHN
MARSHALL: MAIOR OPINIONS AND OTHER WRITINGS 32 (J. Roche ed. 1967).
225. [Boston] Independent Chronicle, March 10, 1803.
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warning was expressed in several executive and legislative attempts
to restrict the judiciary to a narrow, nonpolitical role, the most celebrated of which was the House of Representatives' impeachment of
Justice Samuel Chase. 226 Chase had acted in a partisan manner on
several occasions, but an 1803 grand jury charge led directly to his
impeachment. Chase had commented:
[T]he late alteration of the Federal Judiciary by the abolition of the
office of the sixteen circuit judges, and the recent change in our State
constitution by the establishing of universal suffrage, and the further
alteration that is contemplated in our State judiciary (if adopted) will,
in my judgment, take away all security for property and personal liberty. The independence of the national Judiciary is already shaken to
its foundation, and the virtue of the people alone can restore it. . . .
[O]ur republican constitution will sink into a mobocracy, the worst of
all possible governments.
. . . [T]he modem doctrines by our late reformers, that all men in a
state of society are entitled to enjoy equal liberty and equal rights, have
brought this mighty mischief upon us and I fear that it will rapidly
progress, until peace and order, freedom and property, shall be destroyed.227

Although the Senate acquitted Chase, his impeachment nonetheless
made both Chase and his Federalist colleagues on the bench more
discreet and less partisan.
Early nineteenth-century state judges who stepped into political
controversies likewise encountered difficulties with state legislatures
dominated by Republicans. For example, when Judge Alexander
Addison of Pennsylvania delivered a series of highly partisan grand
jury charges and, with the aid of a Federalist colleague, prevented a
Republican judge from addressing the jury at all, the Republican
legislature impeached, convicted, and removed him from o.ffice. 228
Similarly, when an informal conference of Georgia judges declared
unconstitutional a politically sensitive grant of special relief to debtors and soldiers, the Georgia House of Representatives immediately
prohibited future judicial conferences.229 Finally, when the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court entered the political thicket in 1810
to strengthen the power of the established Congregational Church to
raise taxes for religious purposes, 230 the Republican legislature responded with the Religious Freedom Act of 1811, which not only
226. For descriptions of the impeachment, see R. ELLIS, supra note 17, at 76-82; 1 C. WARsupra note 11, at 269-95.
227. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 674-75 (1804).
228. See R. ELLIS, supra note 17, at 164-65.
229. See A. SAYE, supra note 98, at 190-92.
230. See Barnes v. First Parish, 6 Mass. 401 (1810).
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reversed the court's decision but effectively abolished the religious
establishment. 231
The need of judges in the years after 1800 to stay clear of partisan
controversy in order to retain their offices and preserve the judiciary's independence constituted a powerful impetus to a transformation of the judiciary's role. Marshall, for one, was aware of "[t]he
consequences of refusing to carry . . . into effect" a law enacted by a
popular majority. 232 Nevertheless, the existence of partisan pressures cannot fully explain the substance of Marshall's constitutional
jurisprudence. In his private correspondence, Marshall indicated
that he would "disregard [those pressures] ... when put in competition with what he ... [thought] his duty," 233 and neither Marshall
nor his colleagues on either the federal or the state bench took the
easy course of invariably yielding to the majority's will. Early nineteenth-century judges, at times, continued to interpose the principles
of law in the path of executing the people's will. Marshall and his
contemporaries, in short, strove to reconcile popular will and legal
principle, not to make legal principles subservient to the people's
will.
They did this by distinguishing between the domain of law and
the domain of politics. Indeed, the foundation of Marshall's constitutional jurisprudence is the distinction between political matters, to
be resolved by the legislative and executive branches in the new
majoritarian style, and legal matters, to be resolved by the judiciary
in the government-by-consensus style that had prevailed in most
eighteenth-century American courts. Marshall, of course, invented
neither style,234 nor did he first apply the latter to the adjudicatory
process. His creative act was to use the distinction between law and
politics to circumscribe, however imperfectly, the extent to which the
political, majoritarian style could engulf all government, as it was
threatening in 1800 to ~o.
Merely announcing a line between law and politics does not, of
course, fully differentiate the legal from the political. Hence, it is not
surprising that Marshall's efforts to identify the line were hesitant,
231. See P. GOODMAN, supra note 203, at 162-66; W. NELSON, supra note 58, at 108-09.
232. See Letters of J. Marshall to W. Paterson (April 6, 9, and May 3, 1802), quoted in l C.
WARREN, supra note 11, at 270.
233. Id
234. For early intimations of the distinction between law and politics, see Hartog, The
Public Law of a County Court: Judicial Government in Eighteenth Century Massachusetts, 20
AM. J. LEGAL HisT. 282 (1976); Rowe, Outlawry in Pennsylvania, 1782-1788 and the Achievement ofan Independent Stale Judiciary, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HisT. 227 (1976); Wheeler, Extrajudicial Activities of the Early Supreme Court, 1973 SUP. CT. REV. 123.
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incomplete, and sometimes confused. Nonetheless, despite the difficulty of the task, Marshall and his fellow judges persistently kept in
mind the desirability of adjudicating at least some matters by a
nonmajoritarian standard and thereby restraining "the capricious
will of the rulers of the day."235 Their difficulty came in articulating
consistent and precise criteria for identifying matters appropriately
decided by the legal method. Judges spoke about individual
rights, 236 private rights, 237 natural rights, 238 and rights created by express constitutional restrictions, 239 but they never agreed upon a single, unambiguous criterion of when a right was such that its holder
was entitled to legal protection against political encroachment. The
main thesis of this essay, to be elaborated below, is that early nineteenth-century judges gave effect to express constitutional restrictions and various kinds of rights only when they sensed, however
vaguely, that such action would be supported by a widespread consensus. They thereby reverted to the governance technique of their
eighteenth-century predecessors, though with one difference: Marshall and his contemporaries sought with some but not total success
to reduce the areas of consensus they observed to an analytically rigorous category of rights subject to legal protection. As we examine
the decisions of Marshall and other early nineteenth-century judges,
both the attempt to create this analytical category and the rooting of
the category in an observed consensus should be kept in mind.
A.

The Initial Elaboration of the Law-Politics .Distinction:
Marbury v. Madison and Stuart v. Laird

Marbury v. Madison 240 was the first instance after the 1800 elec-

tion upon which Marshall and the other Federalist justices publicly
235. Boston Gazette, Feb. 13, 1806, at 1, col. 2 (emphasis original).
236. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803); see text at note 250 iefra.
237. See Fletcher v. Peck, IO U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810); Gardner v. Trustees of the Village
of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. 1816); text at notes 264-73 iefra. The law of private and
individual rights to which recourse was had in constitutional cases is not entirely clear, since
that law was in a state of great flux in the opening decades of the nineteenth century. See
generally M. HORWITZ, supra note 120; W. NELSON, supra note 58, at 117-64. This suggests
that, while early nineteenth-century Americans may have been in rough agreement about the
importance of protecting private, individual rights, see text at note 273 iefra, that rough agreement may have existed only because the specifics that such protection would entail had not
been worked out.
238. See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 345 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting); text at note 212 supra.
239. See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819);
United States v. The William, 28 F. Cas. 614 (C.C.D. Mass. 1808) (No. 16,700); White v.
Kendrick, 3 S.C.L. (I Brev.) 469 (1805); see text at note 274 iefra.
240. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
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addressed the task of reconciling popular will and immutable principle.241 As such, it was central to the process of differentiating law
and politics. In that familiar portion of the opinion which asserts the
power of judicial review, Marshall reiterated his belief in "the fundamental principles" of law that were "designed to be permanent." 242
He did not assert, however, that these principles acquired their permanence from any inherent strength, but rather from the "original
right" of the people "to establish, for their future government, such
principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness."243 Thus, Marshall did not reconcile the people's power with
human rights by arguing that rights embodied in the Constitution
had any ultimate moral or historical verity. At no point in the
Marbury opinion did Marshall invoke the language of natural
rights, nor did he rely on precedent or other historical authority. In
fact, he cited only one case in his entire opinion. Marshall instead
evoked the Revolutionary generation's assumption that the people,
exercising their power to create government, had incorporated basic
and generally agreed upon principles of right into their Constitution. 244 This approach was not new, of course; Federalist No. 78245
had formulated it much earlier, and several state judicial review
cases had reiterated it during the 1790s.246 Indeed, Marshall himself
had written during the 1780s of certain "maxims of democracy,"
which included "[a] strict observance of justice and public faith, and
a steady adherence to virtue."247
While Marshall's assumption that the Constitution embodied the
people's rights eliminated the conflict between fixed principle and
popular power at the level of theory, it did little to prevent actual
conflicts. Such conflicts arose when interest groups like religious dissenters sought legislatively to mold a society they thought more just
and thereupon clashed with courts determined to preserve traditional social values. We now tend tp ignore the portions of Marbury
in which Marshall struggled for a standard that would minimize ac241. In Congress' first session after Jefferson's inauguration, it enacted legislation that
postponed the Supreme Court's two 1802 sessions until February 1803. See Act of April 29,
1802, 2 Stat. 156; 1 C. WARREN, supra note 11, at 222-23. Consequently, the Court did not
meet between 1801 and 1803. In 1801, significant cases like Marbury and Stuart v. Laird, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803), were not yet ready for decision.
242. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176-77.
243. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176.
244. See text at notes 213-16 supra.
245. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 491-94 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
246. See State v. - , 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 38 (1794); Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Brock. &
H.) 20 (1793). See also VanHome's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (1795).
247. 3 DEBATES, supra note 183, at 222.
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tual conflict, but the Marshall Court probably considered those the
most important parts. Indeed, from the perspective of the Court's
Federalist Justices, the primary issue in Marbury was not judicial
review, but whether the executive could defy the law.
When summoned before the Court in the preliminary stages of
the case, Department of State officers had claimed not only to be
under no obligation to deliver Marbury's commission, but also to be
privileged, by virtue of their executive status, not to testify about any
transactions concerning the commission. Marshall recognized this as
a potentially far-reaching claim, for if the government asserted such
a privilege in matters involving land patents, which Marshall
thought analogous to commissions for office,248 it would cloud the
title to much of the land west of the Appalachians. Unfounded fears
had intensified the political divisions of 1800, and, whatever the
truth may have been, the Federalist Court doubtless feared that
Thomas Jefferson's new administration might claim to be above the
law in these matters as well as others. Marshall's real difficulty was
that he, unlike more extreme Federalists, could not summarily reject
the claim of executive privilege, for as he had once told his constituents, he believed that the people, and hence their agents in the political branches of government, must sometimes be free to act unbound
by fixed legal principles.249 Accordingly his central task in Marbury
was to specify when law bound the political branches and when it
did not. To do so, he and the Court distinguished between political
matters, such as foreign policy, as to which the legislature and executive were accountable only to the electorate, and matters of individual rights, which the courts would protect by adhering to fixed
principles. In Marshall's own words, "political" subjects "respect[ed] the nation, not individual rights" and were governed by a
political branch whose decisions were "never . . . examinable by the
248. On the early nineteenth-century analogy of officeholding to other kinds of property,
see W. NELSON, supra note 58, at 125. Marbury's counsel specifically argued that, if an individual were "entitled to a patent for lands purchased of the United States" and the Secretary of
State refused "to affix the great seal to the patent," the individual should "have a mandamus to
compel him." "In this respect," he argued, "there is no difference between a patent for lands,
and the commission of a judicial officer." 5 U.S. (l Cranch) at 150 (emphasis original). In his
opinion for the Court, Marshall concluded that- Marbury's commission "conferred legal
rights," 5 U.S. (l Cranch) at 162, and then hypothesized a case in which a "purchaser [ofland],
on paying his purchase-money, becomes completely entitled to the property purchased" but
the Secretary of State chose to "withhold" his "patent," 5 U.S. (l Cranch) at 165. Marshall
asked, "[C]an it be imagined that the law furnishes to the injured person no remedy?" 5 U.S.
(l Cranch) at 165, and used this hypothetical to conclude that ''where a specific duty is assigned [to a cabinet officer] by law, and individual rights depend on the performance of that
duty, it seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself injured, has a right to
resort to the laws of his country for a remedy." 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 166.
249. See text at notes 222-24 supra.
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courts" but "only politically examinable." In contrast stood "the
rights of individuals," respecting which every officer of government
was "amenable to the laws for his conduct; and [could not] at his
discretion sport away . . . vested rights . . . ."250
That distinction runs throughout the Court's opinion and is essential to our understanding of the case. It explains, for example,
how Marshall could plausibly believe that judicial review involved
not an exercise of political discretion by the Court, but merely a
mechanical juxtaposing of statute with Constitution to see if they
conflicted. When the Court could resolve a case according to seemingly fixed principles rather than transient policies, Marshall believed judicial review fell on the law side of the distinction; it was a
judicial protection of immutable, individual rights. However, a case
that required the Court to choose among transient policies or otherwise to exercise political discretion was not in Marshall's estimation
an appropriate case for judicial review.
Similarly, it was the distinction between matters of political discretion and matters of legal right that required the Court to reject
Marbury's argument about the scope of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to award mandamus. It is noteworthy that Marbury's counsel did not press the argument that by granting mandamus in a suit
commenced before it the Supreme Court exercised its original jurisdiction; he almost conceded that Congress could not give the Court
jurisdiction over original matters not specified in the Constitution. 251
Instead, he mainly argued that the Court exercised appellate jurisdiction when issuing mandamus in a proceeding commenced before
it. According to the thrust of his argument, which flowed from an
accurate reading of Federalist No. 81, "the word 'appellate' [was] not
to be taken in its technical sense, . . . but in its broadest sense, in
which it denotes nothing more than the power of one tribunal" to
have "by reason of its supremacy . . . the superintendence of . . .
inferior tribunals and officers, whether judicial or ministerial." 252 In
1803, when the concept of appeal had not yet assumed its relatively
250. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 166.
251. Marbury's counsel, Charles Lee, argued only that "Congress is not restrained from
conferring original jurisdiction in other cases than those mentioned in the constitution," 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) at 148, and made no effort to pursue the argument as Marshall did in his opinion.
His failure to pursue the argument that the Court could issue mandamus as a matter of original jurisdiction is not, however, surprising, since Lee was also counsel in Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 299 (1803), see text at note 256 iefra, decided six days after Marbury, where he
argued that "[n]o act of congress can extend the original jurisdiction of the supreme court
beyond the bounds limited by the constitution." 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 305.
252. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 147, 148. See THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 512 (A. Hamilton) (B.
Wright ed. 1961).
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narrow and precise modem meaning, 253 that argument was plausible, and a Court anxious to grant Marbury relief could easily have
accepted it. However, that position would have contradicted the
opinion's main point, for it would have frequently led the Court to
"revis[e] and correct the proceedings in a cause already instituted" 254
in the executive branch and might thereby have brought before the
Court all the issues, both of law and of fact, that the executive
branch had previously considered.255 Such review might have continually presented the Court with political questions of executive
motive. To avoid this danger and to insure that the Court serve as
the purely legal institution he envisioned, Marshall had to consider a
mandamus against officials, as distinguished from a mandamus
against lower court judges, as an original action in which the lower
court could confine the action's scope to properly legal rather than
political matters. Thus, he had to reject the claim that mandamus
was a direct appeal from the executive to the Supreme Court.
The distinction between law and politics outlined in Marbury
gained force six days later from the Court's disposition of another
case questioning the constitutionality of an act of Congress. Stuart v.
Laird256 passed upon the Republicans' Judiciary Act of 1802,257
which repealed the Federalists' Judiciary Act of 1801.258 Federalists
had contended in Congress that the 1802 Act was unconstitutional
because it deprived judges appointed under the 1801 Act of the lifetime tenure guaranteed by article III, section 1.259 The 1802 Act was
also said to be unconstitutional because it required Supreme Court
Justices to sit as trial judges in circuit courts, thereby conferring an
original jurisdiction which, the argument contended, only the Constitution could confer.260 Marbury, we ought to recall, had been decided on an almost identical ground.
253. See Surrency, The .Development of the Appellate Function: The Pennsylvania
Experience, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 173 (1976).
254. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 175.
255. Such, at least, is the main thrust of counsel's argument for Marbury. See 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) at 147-48.
256. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803).
257. Ch. 8, 2 STAT. 132 (1802).
258. Ch. 4, 2 STAT. 89 (1802).
259. See l ANNALS OF CoNG. 75 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1802) (remarks of Sen. Olcott); id.
at 119 (remarks of Sen. White); id. at 632 (remarks of Rep. Bayard).
260. See I ANNALS OF CONG. 39 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1802) (remarks of Sen. Morris); id.
at 78-79 (remarks of Sen. Morris); kl. at 675 (remarks of Rep. Huger). Of course, there were
also arguments that the repeal of the 1801 Act would impair the judiciary's independence.
See, e.g., id. at 131-32 (remarks of Sen. Chipman); id. at 730 (remarks of Rep. Goddard).
Marshall himself indicated in private correspondence that if presented with the question de
novo, he would conclude that Supreme Court justices could not sit on lower courts. But he
added that the Court's previous acquiescence in circuit duties, as well as the opinions of the
majority of the other justices, inclined him "to execute the law'' of 1802 that imposed circuit
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Nonetheless, the Marshall Court sustained the 1802 Act. The apparent inconsistency between Marbury and Stuart, however, masks a
deeper consistency in the Court's approach. Significantly, the Court
in Stuart never faced the contention that would have most troubled
it: that the 1802 Act unconstitutionally deprived judges of office.
That contention would have involved issues of legally enforceable
private rights, 261 but it was not even raised, for Stuart was not one of
the judges deprived of office; he was merely a litigant objecting to
the transfer of his case from a court constituted under the 1801 Act
to a court constituted under the 1802 Act. His complaint raised no
issue of fundamental private rights, only issues of Congress's political
power to organize the lower federal courts.
There were two such issues. First, could Congress require a litigant to pursue his remedies in one court rather than another? As
Marshall would suggest twenty-four years later in Ogden v.
Saunders, 262 the legislature clearly could control remedies. Second,
could Congress require Supreme Court justices to ride circuit and
thereby exercise an original jurisdiction not enumerated in the Constitution? Marbury had decided, of course, that Congress could not
expand the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, but Stuart could
be distinguished from Marbury, in that the 1802 Judiciary Act required individual justices, not the full Court, to exercise original jurisdiction. Further, as Justice Paterson explained for the unanimous
Court, the 1802 Act merely confirmed "practice and acquiescence
... commencing with the organization of the judicial system."
Such practice and acquiescence "afford[ed] an irresistible answer" to
the claim of unconstitutionality; it was a "practical exposition . . .
too strong and obstinate to be shaken or controlled," and "indeed
fixed the construction" of the Constitution. That the justices had
performed the circuit duties the 1789 Judiciary Act had imposed put
"the question . . . at rest." 263 In Marbury, on the other hand, no
strong public sentiment, precedent, or established practice stood in
the way of holding that the Constitution's language prohibited the
issuance of mandamus as a matter of original jurisdiction.
duties. See Letters from J. Marshall to W. Paterson (April 6, 9, and May 3, 1802), quoted in I
C. WARREN, supra note 11, at 269-71.
261. See note 248 supra. The statements of Marshall quoted in note 248 from Marbury
suggest that the Court would have granted relief to a judge who had been deprived of office
unless the Court was able, as it had been in Marbury, to find a procedural ground for denying
relief.
262. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 353 (1827) (dissenting opinion).
263. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803).
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But a more fundamental fact distinguished Marbury from Stuart.
By invalidating the Republican-sponsored Judiciary Act of 1802, the
Marshall Court would have embroiled itself in a political contest
with Congress and the President which it might not have survived.
If the Court was to withdraw from politics, as Marshall had said in
Marbury it would, it had to capitulate to legislative judgments upon
such politically controversial issues as the constitutionality of the
1802 Act. It therefore sustained the act. By contrast, the only way to
avoid the politics behind Marbury had been to construe the Constitution in a way to which few would object and thereby invalidate
section 13 of the 1789 Judiciary Act. To have issued a writ of mandamus to James Madison as Secretary of State would have thrust the
Court into a political crisis. The Court's only other option-to hold
on substantive grounds that Marbury had no right to the mandamus-would have denied some individuals access to the courts to
enforce their legal rights. In short, to maintain Marshall's compromise-that courts would protect legal rights but refrain from adjudicating political questions-the Court had to decide both Marbury
and Stuart as it did.

B. Marshall and the Protec/ion of Legal Rights
Marshall continued to distinguish between politics and law in
other major constitutional opinions. The next case in which he did
so was Fletcher v. Peck, 264 which involved the validity of two Georgia acts. The first act had granted land to individuals who subsequently passed title to the plaintiff Fletcher, a bona fide purchaser
for value; the second had repealed the first on the ground that the
first had been enacted because several state legislators had been
bribed. The Court was asked to invalidate the first act because of the
bribery, but Marshall declined to do so because "the principle by
which judicial interference would be regulated ... [could] not [be]
clearly discemed." 265 The validity of the first act was not properly a
legal question because the Court could find no fixed, uncontroversial
standards by which to resolve it. On the other hand, Marshall readily voided the second act, because it violated "certain great principles
of justice, whose authority is universally acknowledged." 266 The issue in Fletcher v. Peck was, he observed, "in its nature, a question of
title" 267-more specifically, a question of legislative power to revoke
264. IO U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
265. IO U.S. (6 Cranch) at 130.
266. IO U.S. (6 Cranch) at 133.
267. IO U.S. (6 Cranch) at 133.
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a grant of land by claiming that the grant had been fraudulently
obtained. According to Marshall, the law of land title was clear: "If
a suit be brought to set aside a conveyance obtained by fraud, and
the fraud be clearly proved, the conveyance will be set aside, as between the parties; but the rights of third persons, who are purchasers
without notice, for a valuable consideration, cannot be disregarded. "268 For the Georgia legislature to feel "itself absolved from
those rules of property which are common to all the citizens of the
United States, and from those principles of equity which are acknowledged in all our courts" was for it to act on the authority of "its
power alone." The same power could be used to "divest any other
individual of his lands, if it shall be the will of the legislature so to
exert it. " 269
In sum, the Court had to invalidate one of two Georgia statutes
in Fletcher v. Peck. It did not, however, undertake what Marshall
saw as the essentially political task of identifying which of a legislator's motives for supporting a bill were legitimate. Rather, it appealed to what seemed a fixed legal principle incorporated in the
contract clause of the Constitution and relied upon by the vast majority of American people: that a legislature could not take back land
which it had granted away.
This disposition of Fletcher v. Peck defused a heated political
controversy that had long been raging in Georgia and in the Congress of the United States270 and resolved the case with little negative
comment.271 In my view, the Court enjoyed this success because it
avoided the issue of fraud in the original legislative grant through
which Fletcher claimed title, 272 a volatile issue that would have provoked charges of personal wrongdoing. Instead, the Court passed
upon the scope of state power to seize private property-an issue
which was not yet politically divisive and which could be answered
by invoking widely shared beliefs about individual rights in a republican state.273
268. IO U.S. (6 Cranch) at 133.
269. IO U.S. (6 Cranch) at 134.
270. See generally C. McGRATH, YAZOO 1-19 (1966).
271. Id at 85-88.
272. Id at 7-19.
273. See L. HARTZ, ECONOMIC POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT 22-23, 62-64 (1948);
C. McGRATH, supra note 270, at 77-84. For a state case, which similarly defused a political
controversy, se_e State v. Parkhurst, 9 N.J.L. 427 (1802), a New Jersey case concerning a United
States Senator's right to be a senator and a county clerk simultaneously. The political issue-which of two political factions would control an important local office-was clear, but
the court ably avoided it and deduced a holding from accepted republican principles. Consequently, the case did not permanently favor one faction or propel the judiciary into the funda-
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One can read Trustees of.Dartmouth College v. Woodward2 74 as a
variation on the same theme. The dispute arose when the New
Hampshire legislature attempted to revoke not a grant of land but a
grant of corporate governing privileges that had been made to selfperpetuating trustees who had received land and money from other
individuals. It came to the Supreme Court after a lengthy, bitter political controversy in the state.275 The Court voided the repeal act
because it constituted a taking of vested rights protected by the contract clause. Again Marshall appealed to shared general principles
to support his holding, noting that "[t]he parties in this case differ
less on general principles, . . . than on the application of those principles to this case."276 The parties agreed that "[i]f the act of incorporation be a grant of political power ... or if the State of New
Hampshire, as a government, be alone interested in its transactions,
the subject [was] one in which the legislature of the State may act
according to its own judgment . . . ."277 "But if this be a private
eleemosynary institution, endowed with a capacity to take property
for objects unconnected with government, whose funds are bestowed
by individuals on the faith of the charter," then the legislature was
restrained by the "limitation of its power imposed by the constitution
of the United States."278 After painstakingly analyzing the facts,
Marshall found Dartmouth College a private institution whose property the state accordingly could not take. This disposition of
.Dartmouth College, like the Court's disposition of Fletcher v. Peck,
aroused little criticism from contemporaries.279
C.

Marshall and Political Questions

Marshall enjoyed less success in defusing controversy in cases
that did not involve individual rights unquestioned by most of his
contemporaries. Perhaps the two most controversial cases in which
the Marshall Court invalidated state legislation were McCulloch v.
Maryland2 80 and Gibbons v. Ogden. 281 In both cases, Marshall appealed, as usual, to "proposition[s]" commanding "the universal asmental social issues underlying the factional split; it left the factions free to contest those issues
in the legislature and at the polls.
274. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
215. See 4 A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 14, at 226-36.
276. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 629.
277. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 629-30.
278. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 630.
279. See l C. WARREN, supra note 11, at 487-90.
280. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
281. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824).
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sent of mankind" 282 and to "principle[s]" that were "universally
admitted" 283 or upon which "all America [was] united." 284 But he
ultimately recognized that he could not address the core issue in each
case-the scope of congressional power under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause-as he addressed questions
about private legal rights.
For example, he described the controlling issue in
McCulloch-whether the creation of a national bank was a necessary and proper exercise of Congress' power over the currency-as
"a doubtful question, one on which human reason may pause, and
the human judgment be suspended, [and] in the decision of which
the great principles of liberty are not concerned . . . ."285 When
faced with such a question, Marshall concluded, the Court "must
allow to the national legislature that discretion . . . which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the people."286 To interfere with that
discretion "would be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial
department, and to tread on legislative ground." 287 Marshall immediately "disclaim[ed] all pretensions to such a power."288 In short, he
argued that the McCulloch conflict did not pit the legislature against
an individual vested with universally sanctified rights; hence he
knew that the conflict was not ultimately susceptible to a legal resolution. On the contrary, Marshall contended that this conflict involved questions of power rather than right and that the courts could
only acquiesce in the will of the political branches upon such questions. 2s9
Yielding in McCulloch to the political branches did not defuse
controversy as it had in Fletcher and IJartmouth College, probably
because the distinction between law and politics that was so central
to Marshall's constitutional jurisprudence was directed toward a different issue than McCulloch's core issue. While that distinction was
not irrelevant to the decision of McCulloch, the more important line
282. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 405.
283. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 405.
284. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 191.
285. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 401.
286. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421.
287. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423.
288. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423.
289. Of course, some question existed whether the Supreme Court should defer to the federal legislative branch or to a state legislature. Although this issue was not uncontroverted at
the time of McCu/loch,-the Supremacy Clause seemed to dictate deference to Congress rather
than to a state whenever Congress and the states disagreed about the boundary between their
respective powers.
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to be drawn was that separating the sphere of federal from the
sphere of state power. Marshall, who perhaps intuited what the Civil
War ultimately proved-that the scope of federal jurisdiction is a
matter of power, not right-refused to draw that line, however, and
left it instead to Congress. As a practical matter, this decision denied
that legal limits concerning the scope of national power existed and
thereby sparked controversy and opposition. But, as Marshall himself implied,290 any attempt by the Court to determine for itself the
precise limits of national power would have aroused even more controversy, and the fact is that Marshall's technique ofleaving issues of
national power to the political process worked adequately for nearly
four decades until, in .Dred Scott,291 the Court unsuccessfully began
to pursue a different approach.
In Gibbons v. Ogden 292 as in McCulloch, Marshall withheld giving a definitive construction of the Commerce Clause, insisting
merely that it not be read in a way that would "leave it a magnificent
structure, indeed, to look at, but totally unfit for use." 293 Unlike Justice Johnson, who would have invalidated the New York-granted
steamboat monopoly on the theory that the Commerce Clause in
and of itself prohibited "all invidious and partial restraints" on commerce,294 Chief Justice Marshall merely wanted to insure that Congress could either authorize or eliminate such restraints. In language
reminiscent of Marbury v. Madison, 295 Marshall wrote that in political "instances, as that, for example, of declaring war," the people's
only reliable protections from abuse were "[t]he wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence
which their constituents possess at elections . . . ."296 Marshall invalidated the New York monopoly only because he found it inconsistent with a federal law permitting all licensed vessels to engage in
coastal trade.
In a third case, Sturges v. Crowninshie!d, 291 Marshall engaged in
similar reasoning to uphold in part the constitutionality of state
bankruptcy and insolvency legislation. The Court shied away from
290. See JOHN MARsHALL'S DEFENSE OF McCULLOCH v. MARYLAND 190-91 (G. Gunther
ed. 1969).
291. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
292. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824).
293. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 222.
294. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 231 (concurring opinion).
295. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803); see text at note 250 supra.
296. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 197.
297. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
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"the delicate inquiry"298 whether Congress' power to enact bankruptcy laws preempted all state legislation, and held that the states,
without doubt, could still pass insolvency laws. Noting the "difficulty of discriminating with any accuracy between insolvent and
bankrupt laws," Marshall concluded that any line demarcating federal and state power in the field "must be in a great degree arbitrary"
and that the subject was therefore "one on which the Legislature
may exercise an extensive discretion." 299 Since no federal bankruptcy legislation was then in force, Marshall deferred to the state
political process. He added, however, that no legislature could
impair vested private rights, and accordingly invalidated the
challenged state legislation insofar as it discharged contractual obligations made prior to its enactment.
In short, analysis of the early cases in which the structure of Marshall's constitutional jurisprudence was set suggests that Marshall
gave meaning to the law-politics distinction by treating matters as
legal only when two conditions were met. First, a matter had to concern individual rights. But even then Marshall would not interpose
judicial power in the path of a majority's will unless he felt confident, as in Fletcher and Dartmouth College, that such a legal disposition of a case would command wide public support. If both these
conditions were not met, then Marshall would defer to the political
branches of government-generally, as in Stuart, McCulloch, and
Gibbons, to Congress, if federal legislation applied to the case, but
otherwise, as in Sturges, to the states. Only once, in Marbury, did he
set an act of Congress aside, and there he gave practical effect to the
executive's interest in upholding its policies toward the midnight
judges-an interest which far transcended Congress's concern for the
policies underlying Section 13 of the Judiciary Act.
D.

The Law-Politics Distinction in the Lower Courts

Marshall was not the only judge to employ the emerging distinction between law and politics in constitutional adjudication. One
like-minded judge was John Davis, the federal district judge for the
District of Massachusetts. In United States v. The William, 300 Judge
Davis pondered the constitutionality of congressional legislation effectuating Jefferson's embargo of 1807. Despite his Federalist leanings and the sympathy for mercantile interests he expressed in his
298. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 196.
299. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 195.
300. 28 F. Cas. 614 (C.C.D. Mass. 1808) (No. 16,700).
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opinion, Davis held the legislation constitutional. His opinion primarily discussed judicial review and stated his belief in the court's
power to invalidate acts of Congress. He held, however, that the judiciary's power extended only to cases involving "[a]ffirmative provisions and express restrictions, contained in the constitution, [which
were] sufficiently de.finite to render decisions ... satisfactory."301 In
that way, judicial review would be limited to cases "in which the
superior, commanding, will of the people . . . would be clearly and
peremptorily expressed."302 Davis accordingly refused to exercise
judicial review to strike down Jefferson's embargo, writing:
To extend this censorial power further, and especially to extend it to
the degree, contended for in the objections to the act now under consideration, would be found extremely difficult, if not impracticable, in
execution. To determine where the legitimate exercise of discretion
ends, and usurpation begins, would be a task most delicate and arduous. It would, in many instances, be extremely difficult to settle it, even
in a single body. It would be much more so, if to be adjusted by two
independent bodies, especially if those bodies, from the nature of their
constitution, must proceed by different rules. Before a court can determine, whether a given act of congress, bearing relation to a power with
which it is vested, be a legitimate exercise of that power, or transcend
it, the degree of legislative discretion, admissible in the case, must first
be determined. Legal discretion is limited. It is thus defined by lord
Coke, "Discretio est discemere, per legem, quid sit justum." Political
discretion has a far wider range. It embraces, combines and considers,
all circumstances, events and projects, foreign or domestick, that can
affect the national interests. Legal discretion has not the means of
ascertaining the grounds, on which political discretion may have proceeded. It seems admitted, that necessity might justify the acts in question. But how shall legal discussion determine, that political discretion,
surveying the vast concerns committed to its trust, and the movements
of conflicting nations, has not perceived such necessity to exist? Considerations of this nature have induced a doubt of the competency, or
constitutional authoriiy-ofthe court, to decide an act invalid, in a case
of this description. 303

Since Congress arguably had enacted the embargo pursuant to its
powers to regulate foreign commerce and to wage war, since those
powers concededly authorized at least some interdictions of trade,
and since the propriety of Jefferson's interdiction depended at least
partly on political judgment, Davis decided, much as Marshall had
in Marbury, that the judiciary could not pass upon the embargo's
validity.

.

301. 28 F. Cas. at 620.
302. 28 F. Cas. at 620.
303. 28 F. Cas. at 620.
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Eight years later, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
was asked in Adams v. Howe 304 to determine the constitutionality of
the Religious Freedom Act of 1811, which effectively abolished the
Congregationalist religious establishment in the state. Chief Justice
Isaac Parker, politically a moderate Federalist, wrote the unanimous
affirming opinion. Parker, like Marshall and Davis, did not doubt
the judiciary's power to declare unconstitutional any legislation "diminishing . . . the rights of the citizen . . . ." 305 Nor did Parker
doubt the "evil tendency or inexpediency" of the legislation or "the
injury to public morals and religion" it might cause. 306 Nonetheless,
because invalidating the act would require the court to exercise political discretion-an impermissible form of judicial decision-making-Parker refused to do so. He explained:
(T]he mode ... of executing the will of the people, in this particular, is
left entirely to the legislature: and although laws may be passed, which
have a contrary tendency, and which, in their consequences, may injure, instead of promoting, the public worship; yet the legislature is to
judge: and even their erroneous construction of the design of the people, as expressed in the said declaration, must have legal effect, so far
as they are not manifestly repugnant to the principles of the constitution.
This being the character of the legislative power on this all important subject, we are at a loss to conceive how it can be restrained. . . .
Great responsibility rests upon the legislature, and also upon the people in delegating power to those, who have almost unlimited authority.
If they, with a view to secure the rights of conscience, pass laws within
the letter of the constitution, which may have a tendency injuriously to
affect the regular public worship, it is not for the judiciary power to
control their course.3°7
Almost identical to Adams v. Howe in facts and result was an
1804 Virginia case, Turpin v. Locket,308 in which an equally divided
court of appeals affirmed a decree of Virginia's chancellor which had
sustained the constitutionality of legislation depriving the formerly
established Protestant Episcopal Church of its title to certain glebe
lands. Two judges, St. George Tucker and Spencer Roane, wrote
opinions affirming the decree below. Although both were closely associated with President Jefferson, they adopted a position remarkably similar to Marshall's in Marbury. Tucker asserted that if the
legislature had been "impolitic, and unadvised," it was "competent
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

14 Mass. 340 (1817).
14 Mass. at 348.
14 Mass. at 344, 345.
14 Mass. at 348.
10 Va. (6 Call) 113 (1804).
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to amend, or repeal its . . . act, provided it do not annul, or avoid
any private right, which may have been legally acquired by any individual in his natural capacity, under such act . . . ." In Tucker's
view, the legislature could act freely in matters "having . . . relation
to the community at large" rather than to private rights; on the other
hand, "a court of justice [could] only pronounce [an] act void so far
as it contain[ed] any thing, which the constitution of the commonwealth prohibits the grant of."309 Spencer Roane elaborated the distinction between public matters amenable to political solutions and
private rights protected by law. Roane wrote that he would
not be among those, who assert a right in the government, or even in
the people, to violate private rights, and perpetrate injustice. The just
end and object of all governments, and all revolutions, reprobate this
idea. I trust I shall not be more tardy, than those who are more loud
and clamorous, to respect the vested rights of individuals, or societies. . . . But the question here is, in whom the property in question is
vested? I may be mistaken in my application and inference, but I bow
implicitly to the principle. I apprehend, however, that this position respecting the inviolability of vested rights, only extends to such private
and perfect rights, as are not hostile to the principles of the government: such as are unconnected with, and depend not upon, the existence of the government. Such rights, or emoluments, as are
inseparably connected with, and depend upon the government, must
stand or fall therewith.3 10

In short, Roane would not deny the people's power "to reform the
government"311 through the political process as long as the people
did not thereby interfere with any "vested right."312
309. IO Va. (6 Call) at 156.
310. IO Va. (6 Call) at 169-70 (emphasis original).
311. IO Va. (6 Call) at 170.
312. IO Va. (6 Call) at 169 (emphasis added). But see Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch)
41, 43 (1815) where the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Story, declared unconstitutional the same legislation that had been upheld by the Virginia court in Turpin. According to
Story, the Supreme Court was "standing upon the principles of natural justice ... [and] the
fundamental laws of every free government" in holding that the state legislature could not
deprive religious corporations ofland it had previously granted to them. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at
52. This case's special circumstances made this declaration mere dictum, however, and dictum, furthermore, of trivial importance. The case involved glebe lands in Alexandria, which
Virginia had ceded to the District of Columbia in 1800, and it came to the Supreme Court on
appeal from the circuit court for the ceded district, not from a Virginia state court. Thus, the
Virginia Act of 1801, which deprived the church of glebe lands and which was declared unconstitutional by Story, had never applied to the land in Alexandria since that land had been
ceded to the federal government prior to the Act. See 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 52. The Supreme
Court also declared unconstitutional a 1798 Virginia statute which had repealed post-Revolutionary legislation confirming the church's pre-Revolutionary title to the lands in question.
That statute's invalidation had no effect on the case's outcome, however, since the church
claimed title through pre-Revolutionary grants, which were valid despite the Revolution, the
Court held, because "(t]he dissolution of the regal government ... did not involve in it a
dissolution of civil rights, or an abolition of the common law under which the inheritances of
every man in the state were held." 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 50. The Court also declared it to be
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But, while they would defer to the people's power to reform the
law through the political process, state judges, like Marshall and his
fellow Supreme Court justices, readily struck down legislation that
infringed the vested rights of individuals. For example, in the 1807
Massachusetts case of Ellis v. Marsha/1, 313 Justice Parker, deciding
the constitutionality of an act that taxed an individual for the construction of a road, distinguished between "public act[s], predicated
upon a view to the general good," and "private act[s], obtained at the
solicitation of individuals, for their private emolument, or for the
improvement of their estates." 314 Although he conceded that courts
could not interfere with legislative evaluations of the general good,
Parker invalidated the tax act because it subjected an individual "to
taxation, no/ens volens, for the promotion of a private enterprize."315
Similarly, in the 1816 New York case of Gardner v. Village of
Newburgh, 316 Chancellor Kent voided not a tax but an uncompensated diversion of Gardner's stream by the village. Without compensation, such a taking of private property for public use was
"unjust, and contrary to the first principles of government,"317 principles "admitted by the soundest authorities, and . . . adopted by all
temperate and civilized governments."318 And in a third case, White
v. Kendrick, 319 the Constitutional Court of South Carolina held that
an act extending the jurisdiction of justices of the peace violated one
of "the most valuable possessions of the citizen"-the right to trial
by jury.320
When early nineteenth-century judges refrained from deciding
highly controversial questions and merely protected legal rights
which few Americans questioned, they were not subjected to political attacks. Thus, the judiciary acted without challenge upon such
"a principle of the common law, that the division of an empire creates no forfeiture of previously vested rights of property"-a "principle ... equally consonant with the common sense
of mankind and the maxims ofetemaljustice." 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 50. Since the Court held
that neither the Revolution nor the 1801 Virginia legislation affected the Church's pre-Revolutionary title, its decision of the case did not require finding the 1798 and 1801 Acts unconstitutional. Its dictum was of trivial importance since the Court did not identify any provision of
the Constitution which the Virginia legislation impaired and hence failed to provide Virginia
litigants with a clear ground on which to appeal to the Supreme Court from state court judgments on the basis of Turpin.
313. 2 Mass. 269 (1807).
314. 2 Mass. at 276.
315. 2 Mass. at 277.
316. 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. 1816).
317. 2 Johns. Ch. at 168.
318. 2 Johns. Ch. at 166.
319. 3 S.C.L. (l Brev.) 369 (1805).
320. 3 S.C.L. (l Brev.) at 369.
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matters as: the composition,321 jurisdiction,322 and procedure of the
courts;323 the constitutionality of private acts granting new trials; 324
the competence of a sheriff to assert his recapture of an escaped
debtor as a defense to a creditor's suit against him;325 a municipality's power to enact a building code;326 and the liability of delinquent
clerks for certain statutory penalties.327 Only in Ohio did any of
these cases lead to controversy, but even in this Ohio affair the practice of judicial review received strong support in the legislature,
where a resolution stating that "the courts have the right to judge the
constitutionality of our statutes" failed to pass by only one vote and
where a committee report declaring that the legislature had "no right
to interfere with the court in giving an opinion as to the constitutionality of the law" was accepted by a tie vote. 328
Of course, the courts were sometimes asked prior to the 1820s to
judge legislation resolving divisive conflicts between political interest
groups, but judges generally yielded in those cases to the legislative
policy judgment and refused to invalidate the statute before them.
The relation of church and state, for example, was a primary cause
of political division in Massachusetts and Virginia in the decades
around the tum of the century. After a decade of debate, both legislatures moved toward disestablishment,329 and, as we have seen,330
both state courts deferred to their legislatures. Another political division in many states arose from squatters' improvements upon land
wrongfully occupied,331 but again, when the Tennessee legislature
gave squatters the right to recover for improvements, the Tennessee
321. See, e.g., Cohen v. Hoff, 5 S.C.L. (3 Brev.) 500 (1814).
322. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); Syndics of Brooks v.
Weyman, 3 Martin 9 (La. 1813); Whittington v. Polk, 1 H. & J. 236 (Md. General Ct. 1802);
Rutherford v. McFaddon (Ohio Sup. Ct. 1807), reprinted in OHIO UNREPORTED JUDICIAL DE·
CISIONS 71 (E. Pollack ed. 1952); Emerick v. Harris, 1 Binn. 416 (Pa. 1808); White v. Kendrick, 3 S.C.L. (1 Brev.) 469 (1805); Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20 (1793).
323. See, e.g., Mcilvain v. Holmes, 2 Ky. (Sneed) 317 (1804); Johnson v. Rowland, 2 Ky.
(Sneed) 77 (1801); State v. - , 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 38 (1794).
324. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Hempsted, 3 Day 332 (Conn. 1809); Holden v. James, 11 Mass.
396 (1814); Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N.H. 199 (1818). Cf. Dupy v. Wickwire, 1 D. Chip. 237
(Vt. 1814) (act of the legislature which ordered a particular deposition to be read at trial unconstitutional).
325. Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477 (N.Y. 1811).
326. Respublica v. Duquet, 2 Yeates 493 (Pa. 1799).
327. Caldwell v. Commonwealth, 2 Ky. (Sneed) 129 (1802).
328. Utter, Judicial Review in Early Ohio, 14 Miss. VALLEY HIST. REV. 3, 8-9 (1927).
329. P. GOODMAN, supra note 203, at 162-66; R. BEEMAN, supra note 199, at 93; see H.
EcKENRODE, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN VIRGINIA 74-151 (1910).
330. Adams v. Howe, 14 Mass. 340 (1817); Turpin v. Locket, 10 Va. (6 Call) 113 (1804); see
text at notes 304-12 supra.
331. See, e.g., P. GOODMAN, supra note 203, at 125-27.
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courts accepted the legislative resolution and held the act constitutional.332 State courts also upheld a Georgia act postponing debt
collection suits333 and a Pennsylvania act- regulating the militia. 334
In short, state judges, like Marshall, usually deferred to legislative
judgments on matters of policy and protected only those legal rights
whose substance few Americans questioned.

E. The Pattern

of Early Constitutionalism

In restricting judicial review to cases in which statutes could be
invalidated on the basis of a widely shared consensus about free
men's immutable rights, early nineteenth-century courts acted in a
style reminiscent of the eighteenth century. Aware that they lacked
the power to coerce acceptance of their judgments, Marshall and his
contemporaries on the bench rarely attempted to impose the views of
one segment of society upon another. When society had become so
polarized that shared values could no longer resolve a particular issue, Marshall and his fellow judges simply left the problem to the
legislature and the executive, which had the capacity courts lacked to
engage in extended public disputation, to identify majority preferences, and to impose those preferences on the minority. The courts,
then, resolved only those issues which could be decided with 'little
public disputation-"legal" issues that turned on broadly shared
norms. Like their eighteenth-century predecessors, Marshall and
other early nineteenth-ceIJ-tury judges had only the power to articulate and reason from consensual premises, and they restrained themselves accordingly.
A persistent pattern typified by Marbury v. Madison emerges as
one surveys the early nineteenth-century cases of judicial review.
Whereas the modem Supreme Court, in cases from United States v.
Butler335 to Brown v. Board of Education, 336 has generally invalidated federal and state legislation having substantial political significance, state and federal courts in the early nineteenth century, as a
general rule, invalidated only legislation having almost no political
significance. In the few highly controversial cases like McCulloch v.
Marylantf3 31 in which the Marshall Court did invalidate state statutes, it did so to validate policies already adopted by large majorities
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

Bristoe v. Evans, 2 Tenn. (l Overt.) 341, 346-47 (1815).
Grimball v. Ross, T. Charlt. 175 (Ga. Super. Ct. 1808).
Moore v. Huston, 3 Serg. & Rawl. 169 (Pa. 1817).
297 U.S. l (1936).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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of the Congress rather than to establish a policy of its own. Although our judges cannot do so, early nineteenth-century judges felt
able to distinguish law from politics and thereby to extricate themselves from the political thicket.
One can posit at least two reasons for their success. First, the line
between law and politics was vitally important to the judges who had
drawn it, and they claimed particular matters for the legal side of the
line with corresponding modesty. If they had not invariably abstained from deciding arguably political questions, their attempt to
enforce received legal principles would have seemed political, not
legal, and would have failed. To conserve law's command over
some spheres of social life, the judges had to concede law's irrelevance in others.
Second, the judges succeeded because the issue of judicial review
arose in a transitional period of American history, when some governmental processes had become political but others had not. Political divisions had become sufficiently deep so that some legislation
aroused great controversy, but inherited moral values had not completely broken down, and even the most radical advocates of legislative law-making were unprepared to abandon the still commonly
shared belief that law should insulate certain matters-especially the
rights of individuals-from the political power of the community.
Jefferson and his moderate followers believed in the sanctity of private rights as much as Marshall and the moderate Federalists. The
Jeffersonian program had never included any legislative or executive
assault upon private legal rights, 338 and almost no Jeffersonians objected to judicial protection of those rights. As Jefferson himself announced in his first inaugural address, his object was "a wise and
frugal Government, which shall restrain men from injuring one another, [and which] shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their
own pursuits of industry and improvement";339 as President, Jefferson hoped to pursue "[a] noiseless course, not meddling with the affairs of others."340 Accordingly, the appeal by Marshall and other
judges to law as the protector of private rights fell upon receptive
ears, and their proposed separation of law from politics was initially
accepted as a fundamental doctrine of American constitutional law.
In 1809, James Madison ascended to the presidency, and Mar338. See R. ELLIS, supra note 17, at 30-35.
339. Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address, reprinted in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 323 (J. Richardson ed. 1898).
340. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Cooper (Nov. 29, 1802), quoted in R. ELLIS,
supra note 17, at 71.
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shall's goal of preserving the law from the intrusions of politics came
within reach. At the very outset of his presidency, Madison mobilized federal force to execute the Supreme Court's judgment in United
States v. Peters341 after Pennsylvania's Republican governor had
called out the militia to prevent it. 342 Likewise, Congress appropriated funds several years later to enforce the Court's mandate in
Fletcher v. Peck. 343 After 1809, in short, the Marshall Court gained
support from Republicans in both the executive and the legislative
branches and thus was free to pursue its work in a nonpartisan manner in its newly delimited legal sphere.
Marshall's accomplishment, however, proved only temporary.
The era of majoritarian democracy ushered in by Andrew Jackson's
presidency unequivocally signalled the end of whatever legal consensus had existed. The Marshall Court received intimations of collapse perhaps as early as 1823 when a storm of protest344 vindicated
Justice Washington's suspicion that "a great diversity of opinion prevail[ed]"345 about the issues in Green v. Bidd/e. 346 By 1827, Marshall's traditional appeal to natural rights failed to command a
majority of the Court in Ogden v. Saunders, 347 and several years
later Georgia refused to obey the Court's mandate in the Cherokee
removal cases. 348 For state judges, consensus also began to disintegrate as early as 1823, when the Kentucky Court of Appeals
struck down debtor relief legislation349 and was thereupon abolished
by the legislature. The abolition of the court produced two years of
nationally prominent political strife between advocates of the old
court, which refused to accept its own abolition, and advocates of the
new, which the legislature had established in the old court's place.350
For some, the collapse of consensus was a reason for abandoning
341. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809).
342. See 4 A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 14, at 18-21; I C. WARREN, supra note I I, at 374-87.
343. IO U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
344. See 4 A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 14, at 374-82, who examines proposals introduced in
Congress to repeal § 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, I Stat. 73, which gave the Supreme Court
power to review state judgments, to increase the size of the Court, and to require special majorities to invalidate legislation. There were also resolutions in the state legislature to "call
forth the physical power of the state, to resist the execution of the decisions of the court." 29
NILES WEEKLY REGISTER 228, 229, quoted in A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 14, at 382.
345. Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) I, 93 (1823).
346. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) I (1823).
347. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
348. See 2 C. WARREN, supra note 11, at 205-29.
349. See Lapsley v. Brashears, 14 Ky. (4 Litt.) 47 (1823); Blair v. Williams, 14 Ky. (4 Litt.)
34 (1823).
350. See DuRelle, John Boyle, in 2 GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS 248-58 (W. Lewis ed.
1907).
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judicial review. Pennsylvania's John Banister Gibson, for example,
recited the arguments against judicial review in his 1825 dissenting
opinion in Eakin v. Raub.351 He noted that "[r]epugnance to the
constitution is not always self-evident" and that since men "seldom
. . . think exactly alike," "conflicts" in interpreting constitutional
provisions would be "inevitable."352 If the judiciary once began to
consider unconstitutionality, he wondered, "where shall it stop."353
Gibson discerned no clear lines particularly since reviewing legislation's constitutionality required courts to make what he labelled "political," not "civil" or legal determinations. 354 Further, he argued
that the legislature had "pre-eminence" in government: "the power
to legislate" is "the power of the people, and sovereign as far as it
extends."355 Gibson could see no basis for courts to question politi-cal decisions made by the people; for him, judicial review denied "a
postulate in the theory of our government, and the very basis of the
superstructure, that the people are wise, virtuous, and competent to
manage their own affairs."356
Ultimately, of course, Gibson's views have been rejected, and judicial review has become a cornerstone of American constitutionalism. With the rise of majoritarian democracy, however, and with the
corresponding collapse of consensus, the courts now practice judicial
review under conditions quite different from those in which it may
have originated.

IV.

CONCLUSION

How does this essay's interpretation of John Marshall's constitutional jurisprudence square with the older interpretations of Marshall•.as a principled adjudicator, a politically motivated nationalist,
or a servant of the interests of privileged elites?
This essay does not deny the principled quality of Marshall's
constitutional jurisprudence. Although I doubt that Marshall found·
in the intentions of the framers constitutional principles that dictated
particular results and although I am uncertain whether his decisions
yielded principles that specified future results, this essay's thesis precludes neither possibility. Marshall would not have undercut his efforts to maintain a legal consensus if he had decided cases on the
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
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basis of principles written into the Constitution's text. It is also possible to imagine how his elaboration of an existing consensus might
have produced principles that would influence subsequent decisions.
Two limited aspects of Marshall's nationalism also cannot be
gainsaid. First, Marshall consistently denied that states could prevent the enforcement of federal court judgments. Second, if federal
and state legislation actually or potentially conflicted in their resolution of political questions, Marshall always deferred to Congress
rather than the state legislature.357
These limited expressions of nationalism were entirely consistent
with and perhaps even compelled by Marshall's jurisprudential
premise that the courts should only consider issues resolvable by
consensual values and should remit other issues to the political process. That premise required that court judgments based on widely
accepted constitutional precepts be enforced despite the recalcitrance
of individual states. At the same time, however, that premise afforded Marshall little guidance for second-guessing policy judgments-like establishing the Second Bank-made by Congress after
years of intense political debate. It also gave Marshall little opportunity in cases like Gibbons and Sturges to delineate the precise scope
of constitutional provisions like the commerce and bankruptcy
clauses. In those cases, in short, Marshall's jurisprudential premises
barred him from limiting Congress' power to legislate within the ambiguous penumbrae of major federal powers, while the supremacy
clause provided at least some authority for constraining state power.
Hence it is not surprising that Marshall required states to respect
federal legislation and widely valued individual rights, but that he
otherwise formulated no definitive constitutional rules, leavin~ the
357. Although Marshall may appear to have occasionally stretched the meaning of federal
or state legislation to create a conflict and an opportunity to uphold national power, see Brown
v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824),
he did not consistently read congressional legislation broadly to enhance national power. Two
notable examples of his restraint are United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
32 (1812), and Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819). In Hudson, Marshall
could have read§ 11 of the Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 78 (1789), which gave circuit
courts jurisdiction over crimes committed against the United States, to confer federal common-law jurisdiction by implication, as Justice Story did two years later in United States v.
Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 14,857). Marshall declined to read the
section that way, however. Likewise, in Sturges he explicitly declined to hold that expired
federal bankruptcy laws extinguished state power over the field; instead, he concluded that
Congress' legislation had merely suspended state power which had subsequently revived when
the federal act lapsed. See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 196. That Marshall's decision in Gibbons
voided a monopoly and his decision in Brown v. Maryland invalidated a tax, while Sturges
upheld popular debtor relief laws and Hudson condemned a politically unpopular federal
common law of crimes, suggests that Marshall may have construed legislation with an eye to
public opinion. However, the subject of Marshall's legislative construction requires full analysis on another occasion.
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political process, ultimately under Congress' guidance, to set the precise boundaries of national authority.
Even if one accepts Beveridge's or Frankfurter's more expansive
view of Marshall's nationalism, this essay's thesis offers useful insight into how that nationalism was cabined. The theory that Marshall's personal qualities enabled him to restrain his political
tendencies does not explain the similar restraint of many state
judges, whereas this essay's suggestion that early nineteenth-century
judges recognized the danger of deciding controversial political
questions other than by broadly accepted norms does explain why
most judges, including Marshall, restrained themselves. When they
heeded the political realities of their time, nearly all judges saw, as
the Marshall Court saw in United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, that
they could not read personal preferences into constitutional law
when contrary rules had "been long since settled in public opinion"
and by "the general acquiescence of legal men."358
In sum, if one understands Marshall as a nationalist, one should
at least also understand him as a nationalist unwilling to undermine
existing consensus. Once Marshall's nationalism is so understood,
the historical interpretations that emphasize his nationalism no
longer sharply conflict with this essay; to view Marshall as a nationalist constrained by consensus di.ffers little from viewing him as a
consensus builder who preferred national to local resolution of conflict when there was no consensus.
The thesis of this essay that Marshall embodied in constitutional
principle only widely accepted values cannot be as easily reconciled,
however, with the claim that he consciously served privileged elites
at the expense of other groups. Governing by consensus might have
had the ultimate effect of benefitting some groups more than others,
but it is difficult to understand how a judge could simultaneously see
himself as the advocate of a single group and the protector of the
entire society.359 Where the interests of groups clash, in cases like
Sturges v. Crowninshield, a judge like Marshall who is aware of the
clash has few choices. He can explicitly favor one group rather than
another. He can allow another institution to resolve the conflict. Or
he can attempt to decide the issue on principled grounds that transcend any one group's interests. A judge cannot do all three things,
358. 11 U.S. (I Cranch) 32, 32 (1812).
359. Even a judge who believes that furthering the interests of a particular group benefits
the entire society is likely to have a greater ultimate allegiance to one rather than the other and
will have to display that allegiance whenever the interests of the group and the society are not
plainly consistent.
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however, with a single issue. He must favor one group, favor
whatever groups control the political process, or favor no group at
all.
This essay has argued that Marshall resolved issues without
favoring any group if he could find a commonly shared premise on
which to do so and that otherwise he would defer to legislative judgments. This interpretation explains why early nineteenth-century
judges sometimes protected vested interests but at other times did
not, and it does so without introducing imprecise qualifications
which interpretations emphasizing Marshall's elitism require. This
is the same advantage that viewing Marshall as a nationalist constrained by consensus has over viewing him as a nationalist constrained by personal traits labelled empiricism and pragmatism.
The greater consistency and precision of this new interpretation
does not, however, necessarily make it true. Some readers, I am
sure, will not find entirely credible Part I's portrait of eighteenthcentury government by consensus. Concededly, I am insufficiently
expert about the details of eighteenth-century American life to assert
confidently that there was a widespread moral consensus at the time.
Indeed, the knowledge of the entire historical profession may not
warrant definitive assertions on that subject. Even my conclusion
that eighteenth-century American juries could determine law as well
as fact cannot be proved, for yet-unexamined archival material could
refute it. I do believe that substantial evidence supports this tentative conclusion and that historians are not likely to discover massive
evidence that will destroy it, but new evidence might allow me to
state my generalizations about juries and hence about eighteenthcentury government more qualifiedly and precisely than is now possible. Indeed, I hope that this essay sufficiently suggests the importance of the question of jury power that more historians will join the
few who so far have searched eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century judicial archives for answers.
Even if eighteenth-century Americans often governed by consensus, as Part I argued, there is no way of knowing whether John Marshall and his contemporaries thought about judicial review in the
context of that society or in the context of emerging nineteenth-century class divisions. The historian's only certain conclusion about
Marshall and the origins of judicial review is that Marshall may
have been a conservator of consensus or that he may have championed, with a restraint we can only roughly estimate, the interests of
emerging elites. Unfortunately, the key evidence about the inner
workings of his mind evades our reach.
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Why, then, a new interpretation? First, while it cannot be proved
true, its elaboration questions the received wisdom that Marshall
and his contemporaries imbued constitutional doctrine with Federalist political principles. Perhaps Marshall's objectives on the bench
were highly political, but it is also possible to perceive Marshall as
having sought to resolve the great political issue of his
time-whether popular will or fixed principle should be the source
of law-by recourse to a nonpolitical governance technique drawn
from an earlier time: the appeal to consensus.
Second, this new interpretation of Marshall's judicial goals may
stimulate thought about how the judicial process has functioned and
ought to function. For better or for worse, the traditional wisdom
about early American constitutionalism has shaped the public's view
of courts, particularly its view of the Supreme Court, since at least
the 1930s. It has also inspired outstanding historical scholarship, the
work of Edward Corwin being but one example. Finally, the received wisdom has led scholars such as Alexander Bickel to analyze
in depth how nonpolitical institutional devices can restrain judges'
political tendencies. The new interpretation of Marshall and his
contemporaries likewise suggests new topics for historical research
and a new public conception of the courts' role in constitutional
cases. In addition, the new interpretation suggests that legal and political theorists might, if they wish, analyze the political and
nonpolitical aspects of the judicial process not only by examining
how institutional practices can limit politically inclined men, but
also by defining more precisely what makes politics political and
hence what might make law nonpolitical. The failure of Marshall
and his contemporaries to mark out a precise line between the domains of law and politics leads me to doubt whether scholars of our
time will enjoy greater success in drawing that line. On the other
hand, the success of Marshall's generation in keeping core segments
of the constitutional process free, at least temporarily, from the intrusions of politics raises a possibility that we, too, might sometimes
be able, if we try, to perceive some portions of constitutional law as
beyond the pale of political controversy. Perhaps others will find
this possibility worthy of pursuit.

